

THE ELECTORAL INTEGRITY PROJECT

WHY ELECTIONS FAIL AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT



THE YEAR IN ELECTIONS, 2017 MID-YEAR UPDATE

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Table of Contents

I: INTRODUCTION:.....	4
<i>Figure 1: The Global Map of Electoral Integrity</i>	5
<i>Figure 2: The Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Index (PEI-5.5)</i>	6
<i>Figure 3: PEI Index for elections from January 1 to June 30, 2017</i>	7
II: CHALLENGES IN VOTER REGISTRATION.....	8
<i>Figure 4: Dimensions of electoral integrity</i>	8
<i>Table 1: Correlations with the PEI Index</i>	9
<i>Figure 5: Security and inclusion in voter registration</i>	10
III: ELECTORAL INTEGRITY BY GLOBAL REGION.....	11
<i>Figure 6: The PEI Index for elections, 1 Jan-30 June 2017</i>	11
Northern and Western Europe: France.....	12
<i>Figure 7: Nordic states lead in electoral integrity</i>	12
<i>Figure 8: Declining voter turnout in French National Assembly elections</i>	13
The Americas: Ecuador.....	14
<i>Figure 9: Ecuador's declining electoral integrity</i>	15
Central and Eastern Europe: Serbia.....	16
<i>Figure 10: Media coverage key concern in Serbian 2017 Presidential election</i>	16
<i>Figure 11: Serbia's media sub-dimension scores in regional context</i>	17
The Asia-Pacific: Timor-Leste.....	18
The Middle East and North Africa: Algeria.....	19
Sub-Saharan Africa: The Gambia.....	20
IV: SUB-DIMENSIONS OF ELECTORAL INTEGRITY BY COUNTRY.....	21
<i>Table A1: Country coverage</i>	25
<i>Table A2: Factors predicting expert perceptions of electoral integrity scores</i>	26
<i>Table A3: PEI Survey Questions</i>	28
VI: BIBLIOGRAPHY OF EIP PUBLICATIONS, ALPHABETICAL ORDER BY AUTHOR.....	29
VII: REFERENCES.....	33

I: INTRODUCTION:

Elections provide regular opportunities for citizens to determine how they are governed and by whom, although the integrity of these contests varies by country and region. Electoral malpractices, from overt cases of violence and voter intimidation to more subtle campaigns of disinformation, continue to undermine contests around the world. The Perceptions of Electoral Integrity expert survey monitors elections globally and regionally, across all stages of the electoral cycle.

This mid-2017 report describes the latest update of the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity dataset (PEI 5.5). The release is drawn from a survey of 2,961 experts providing perceptions of electoral integrity. The cumulative study covers 161 countries holding 260 national elections from July 1, 2012 to June 30, 2017. This update reports on an additional 19 elections held in 18 countries from 1 January to 30 June 2017, including states such as France, the Bahamas, and Timor-Leste for the first time.

Perceptions of electoral integrity are measured using a rolling survey completed by experts in each country one month after polls close. The experts are asked to assess the quality of national elections on eleven sub-dimensions: electoral laws; electoral procedures; district boundaries; voter registration; party registration; media coverage; campaign finance; voting process; vote count; results; and electoral authorities. These sum to an overall Electoral Integrity Index scored from 0 to 100.

Figure 1 presents the updated global map of electoral integrity, divided into five categories ranging from very low to very high levels of electoral integrity, as measured through the PEI survey.

Figure 2 shows the updated cumulative comparisons of countries ranked by the PEI Index in each global region. These figures provide an overview of the state of electoral integrity around the world.

At the top of the scale worldwide are the Nordic countries, including Denmark, Finland and Norway, while at the other end of the spectrum are flawed and failed contests in countries such as Ethiopia and Burundi in Sub-Saharan Africa.


To examine the results in more detail, Figure 3 shows a breakdown for scores across the eleven dimensions of the electoral cycle for all 18 countries with national contests held from 1 Jan to 30 June 2017 covered in PEI 5.5. The results show that the Netherlands, France, the Republic of Korea and UK are well ranked, while by contrast Iran, Serbia, Armenia and Algeria performed poorly. The PEI Index scores often proved to be fairly stable across successive equivalent contests in each country, for example the UK. But some countries showed greater variations across successive contests, for reasons examined several of the case-studies.

Campaign finance was again the weakest stage across most elections – but problems were observed across multiple dimensions in countries ranked most poorly. A similar detailed profile for all indicators covering 161 countries contained in PEI-5.5 is listed on page 21.

This report proceeds across five sections. Part II highlights one of the major challenges of electoral integrity, the voter registration process, emphasizing the need to balance both security and accessibility. Part III provides an overview of electoral integrity by region, with brief case studies on elections conducted in 2017: France in Northern and Western Europe, Ecuador in the Americas; Timor-Leste in the Asia-Pacific; Serbia in Central and Eastern Europe; Algeria in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA); and The Gambia in Sub-Saharan Africa. Parts IV and V provide further reference and technical information.

This is a mid-term report and the next release of the dataset will include all national parliamentary and presidential elections held during 2017. All electronic data can be downloaded, at the levels of 2,961 experts, 260 elections, and 161 countries, from <http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/PEI>

Figure 1: The Global Map of Electoral Integrity



Source: *The Perceptions of Electoral Integrity expert survey (PEI 5.5), country-level, 2012-mid-2017*

Figure 2: The Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Index (PEI-5.5)

N&W Europe			Americas			C&E Europe			Asia-Pacific			Middle East & North Africa			Africa		
Country	PEI Index		Country	PEI Index		Country	PEI Index		Country	PEI Index		Country	PEI Index		Country	PEI Index	
Denmark	86	●	Costa Rica	81	●	Estonia	79	●	New Zealand	75	●	Israel	74	●	Cape Verde	71	●
Finland	86	●	Uruguay	75	●	Lithuania	78	●	Taiwan	73	●	Tunisia	68	●	Benin	70	●
Norway	83	●	Canada	75	●	Slovenia	76	●	Republic of Korea*	73	●	Oman	61	●	Ghana	65	●
Iceland	83	●	Brazil	68	●	Czech Republic	76	●	Australia	70	●	Morocco	57	●	Mauritius	64	●
Sweden	80	●	Chile	67	●	Slovak Republic	74	●	Japan	68	●	Kuwait	54	●	Rwanda	64	●
Germany	80	●	Jamaica	67	●	Poland	74	●	Tonga	67	●	Jordan	49	●	South Africa	63	●
Netherlands*	80	●	Grenada	66	●	Latvia	71	●	Mongolia	64	●	Iran*	49	●	Lesotho*	62	●
Switzerland	79	●	Argentina	65	●	Croatia	65	●	Vanuatu	62	●	Turkey	47	●	Namibia	60	●
Austria	78	●	Barbados	63	●	Georgia	60	●	Timor-Leste*	61	●	Algeria*	44	●	Botswana	58	●
France*	75	●	Peru	62	●	Bulgaria*	58	●	Bhutan	61	●	Iraq	44	●	Sierra Leone	57	●
Portugal	74	●	United States	61	●	Hungary	56	●	Micronesia*	59	●	Egypt	43	●	Ivory Coast	57	●
Belgium	71	●	Panama	61	●	Moldova	56	●	India	59	●	Bahrain	38	●	Guinea-Bissau	55	●
Ireland	71	●	Colombia	60	●	Romania	56	●	Maldives	57	●	Syria	24	●	Burkina Faso	53	●
Cyprus	70	●	Mexico	57	●	Albania*	55	●	Indonesia	57	●			Nigeria	53	●	
Spain	69	●	Cuba	57	●	Kyrgyzstan	54	●	Solomon Islands	57	●			Sao Tome & Principe	53	●	
Italy	66	●	Bolivia	56	●	Bosnia	52	●	Myanmar (Burma)	54	●			Central African Republic	53	●	
Greece	66	●	Paraguay	55	●	Montenegro	51	●	Samoa	54	●			Mali	53	●	
UK*	66	●	El Salvador	54	●	Ukraine	51	●	Nepal	53	●			Niger	52	●	
Malta*	65	●	Belize	54	●	Serbia*	48	●	Fiji	53	●			Gambia*	50	●	
			Bahamas*	54	●	Macedonia	48	●	Singapore	52	●			Malawi	48	●	
			Guyana	53	●	Armenia*	47	●	Sri Lanka	52	●			Cameroon	46	●	
			Suriname	50	●	Kazakhstan	45	●	Philippines	51	●			Comoros	46	●	
			Ecuador*	50	●	Russia	44	●	Thailand	51	●			Swaziland	45	●	
			Guatemala	48	●	Belarus	39	●	Pakistan	50	●			Zambia	45	●	
			Venezuela	45	●	Uzbekistan	38	●	Laos	47	●			Mauritania	44	●	
			Honduras	45	●	Tajikistan	35	●	Bangladesh	39	●			Tanzania	44	●	
			Dominican Republic	44	●	Azerbaijan	35	●	Malaysia	35	●			Sudan	43	●	
			Nicaragua	36	●	Turkmenistan*	34	●	Vietnam	34	●			Guinea	42	●	
			Haiti	31	●			Afghanistan	32	●			Kenya	41	●		
								Cambodia	32	●			Madagascar	40	●		
													Togo	38	●		
													Uganda	37	●		
													Angola	36	●		
													Zimbabwe	35	●		
													Mozambique	35	●		
													Gabon	34	●		
													Chad	31	●		
													Djibouti	30	●		
													Congo, Rep.	28	●		
													Equatorial Guinea	26	●		
													Burundi	25	●		
													Ethiopia	24	●		
Regional mean	75			57			56			55			50			47	

* = election in 2017
Source: PEI-5.5

Key: = Very High / High (60+) = Moderate (50-59) = Low / Very Low (Less than 50)

Source: The Perceptions of Electoral Integrity expert survey (PEI 5.5), country-level

Figure 3: PEI Index for elections from January 1 to June 30, 2017

PEI-5.5 Global Rank	Country	Type	Previous PEI Index	PEI-5.5 Index	PEI Index change	Electoral Laws	Electoral procedures	District boundaries	Voter registr.	Party registr.	Media coverage	Campaign finance	Voting process	Vote count	Results	Electoral authorities
8	Netherlands	Leg.	78	82	3	92	90	70	85	80	68	66	74	89	90	88
18	France*	Both	N/a	75		69	93	68	64	76	63	67	71	91	73	85
24	Rep. of Korea	Both	71	72	0	53	87	62	81	70	56	64	75	90	81	83
41	United Kingdom	Leg.	65	66	1	40	86	46	51	69	43	55	73	88	76	80
44	Malta	Leg.	65	64	-2	49	85	53	67	67	43	38	64	88	81	78
54	Lesotho	Leg.	64	61	-3	78	78	69	47	62	51	37	52	78	72	76
57	Timor-Leste*	Pres.	N/a	61		66	75	50	53	63	50	35	58	76	78	70
63	Micronesia	Leg.	62	59	-3	65	65	67	42	69	51	37	59	70	65	66
66	Bulgaria	Both	60	58	-2	61	64	60	42	65	45	40	53	75	68	64
80	Albania	Leg.	54	55	0	46	65	55	63	51	49	34	47	71	75	57
87	Bahamas	Leg.	N/a	54		43	60	42	37	45	58	47	49	69	72	61
106	The Gambia*	Both	48	52	4	35	72	48	38	53	38	26	45	71	55	69
108	Ecuador*	Pres.	55	44	-11	37	58	39	49	54	42	36	60	58	51	46
110	Iran	Both	45	47	2	29	67	43	58	27	47	36	52	58	71	52
111	Serbia*	Both	46	43	-3	47	60	55	32	53	30	34	53	61	55	50
116	Armenia	Both	44	51	7	53	47	59	40	54	53	30	41	60	47	46
128	Algeria*	Both	43	45	2	31	49	47	45	41	44	27	51	54	50	37
149	Turkmenistan	Both	37	31	-6	23	45	44	38	26	14	21	35	37	73	28


Note: The previous PEI Index is calculated for the national election immediately prior to the latest contest. Change is calculated as the difference between previous and latest ratings. For more details, see the description of the selected case-studies, denoted (*).

Source: *The Perceptions of Electoral Integrity expert survey (PEI 5.5), election-level*

II: CHALLENGES IN VOTER REGISTRATION

Major problems in electoral integrity can undermine public confidence in electoral processes. These can occur throughout the electoral cycle. Although public perceptions of electoral malpractice often centre on the vote count, problems frequently occur earlier in the cycle, for instance in electoral laws, district boundaries, or voter registration processes.¹ The PEI expert surveys assess electoral integrity across each stage of the electoral cycle. On average across the sample of 161 countries, expert respondents have rated campaign finance, media coverage, and voter registration as the most problematic stages, as shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Dimensions of electoral integrity



Note: Chart shows average scores on each of the sub-dimensions of the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Index (scored from 0 to 100) across 161 countries;

Source: PEI 5.5, country-level, 2012-mid-2017

Voter registration has always been an important stage of the electoral process. Problems of voter registration cover a wide range of malpractices, from disenfranchisement to maladministration and fraud.² As the U.S. and UK show, even in long-established democracies disputes occur about some basic procedures, such as whether or not it is appropriate to demand some form of photo identification at the registration or polling place. In developing countries without reliable census information or identification documents the challenges are even greater.³ International IDEA notes that existing lists are often of poor quality, which can create opportunities for vote manipulation.⁴ To evaluate these issues, PEI monitors expert perceptions of three aspects of voter registration:

- (i) *Inclusion*, measured by whether some citizens were not listed on the register, for any reason;
- (ii) *Accuracy*, measured by whether the electoral register was accurate; and
- (iii) *Security*, measured by whether some ineligible electors were registered.

These qualities can be regarded as equally important for ensuring that all eligible citizens, and only eligible citizens, have access to their fundamental voting rights.⁵ Thus these three items are aggregated to measure the 100-point Voter Registration Index. At the same time, there can be trade-offs between inclusion and security, generating heated debates.⁶

International IDEA's guidelines suggest that several standards are important: *"The legal framework should require that voter registers be maintained in a manner that is transparent and accurate, protects the right of qualified citizens to register, and prevents the unlawful or fraudulent registration or removal of persons."*⁷

It is critical to strike the right balance between making registration accessible and making it secure. Easier registration processes, such as by expanding convenience for citizens through online applications and the use of same-day registration, have been found consistently to strengthen voter turnout.⁸ But the introduction of easier registration without sufficient verification checks has also been found to raise security risks of abuse and fraud.⁹ Strict registration processes, such as those relying on biometric technologies for ID, may remove ineligible applicants but simultaneously throw out legitimate electors and thus make the list less accurate, not more.¹⁰ Biometric voter registration, adopted in many African countries, presents challenges for the protection of personal information.¹¹ So supplementing the analysis of the overall Voter Registration Index by looking at these three measures separately is also valuable, for a deeper dive into the evidence.

In practice, electoral registers may fail to meet international standards, and electoral officials need to determine the most appropriate administrative arrangements concerning the use of responsibilities of the state and citizens, the use of continuous or periodic roll updates, the choice of paper or electronic rolls, the delegation of administrative responsibility to local officials, any residency requirements, the rules governing the suspension of voting rights, and efforts to enfranchise marginalized groups like young people, the disabled, women and linguistic or ethnic minorities.¹² Determining which individuals are eligible to vote, and the ways that their registration is facilitated or obstructed, raises complex challenges. The ACE Project provides case-studies illustrating the pros and cons of alternative processes.¹³

What does the PEI evidence show about the most common problems – and where do these occur?

The results suggest that every global region except Scandinavia faces voter registration challenges. Almost one in three countries worldwide scores 'very low' on the voter registration index. Sub-Saharan Africa has particularly serious problems, with more than half of these countries scoring 'very low'.

Table 1: Correlations with the PEI Index

	Voter registration index	Some citizens were not listed in the register	The electoral register was inaccurate	Some ineligible electors were registered	N. countries
PEI index of electoral integrity	.817**	.725**	.802**	.804**	161
UNDP Human Development Index	.666**	.617**	.592**	.560**	158
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international \$) (WDI)	.595**	.531**	.523**	.503**	155
Combined Democracy Score (Polity/FH)	.415**	.406**	.438**	.394**	146
Liberal democracy index (V-Dem)	.678**	.623**	.653**	.656**	147
Electoral democracy index (V-Dem)	.632**	.584**	.618**	.601**	147

Note: ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level

Sources: PEI 5.5 and the Quality of Government Dataset (Jan 2017)


To compare the types of states most vulnerable to registration problems, we can examine the relationship linking the scores on the voter registration index, as well as the components monitoring Inclusion, Accuracy and Security of the registration process, with several standard measures of political and economic development.

As shown in Table 1, the measures were strongly related with all the selected indices, including the UNDP's measure of human development, the World Bank's Development Indicator of economic development (GDP per capita in ppp), as well as the Varieties of Democracy and Polity/Freedom House measures of democracy. The three separate measures were also all highly inter-correlated, forming a consistent scale.¹⁴ The survey evidence suggests that experts perceived these three aspects of voter registration to be interconnected problems. But which problems are most common, lack of inclusiveness or lack of security.

The worldwide comparison in Figure 5 shows that some states located in the top right quadrant performed well on both indicators, notably Sweden, Denmark and Finland, as well as Slovakia, Costa Rica and the Czech Republic. By contrast, others located in the bottom left quadrant performed poorly on both measures, as well as on the overall PEI Index, such as Syria (which failed to allow citizens to vote if they had fled to neighbouring states as refugees), Haiti (which lacked capacity to administer elections), Bahrain (with internal conflict), and Afghanistan (with high levels of electoral corruption).¹⁵

Less predictably, however, states in the bottom right quadrant scored more poorly on inclusiveness than security; that is to say, experts thought that the more serious voter registration problem was one of excluding eligible citizens, for example due to disputed citizenship rights, attempts at voter suppression, lack of capacity to include young people, women, linguistic or ethnic minorities, hard-to-reach rural populations, or failing to maintain up-to-date rolls. The prevalence of voter exclusion issues, including among several otherwise high-performing electoral systems, underscores the difficulties associated with balancing access and security in voter registration.

Figure 5: Security and inclusion in voter registration



Note: Item coding: 1=Strongly Agree, 5=Strongly Disagree; Regimes using Freedom House categories.

Source: PEI 5.5, country-level.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights enshrines the right to universal and equal suffrage.¹⁶ Accurate, inclusive and secure processes of registration precede the act of voting, and are critical to realizing these rights. In practice, however, several constraints limit access to voter registers. The PEI evidence suggests that many countries need further electoral assistance to meet international standards, such as those outlined in the Council of Europe Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters regarding the publication and maintenance of electoral registers.¹⁷ The case-studies discussed in the subsequent section of this report provide further insights into problems surrounding voter registration, alongside other aspects of the electoral cycle.

III: ELECTORAL INTEGRITY BY GLOBAL REGION


What are the broader patterns of electoral integrity across the different world regions? As indicated earlier in Figure 2, Northern and Western Europe persists as the highest-performing region, followed by the Americas, Central and Eastern Europe, the Asia-Pacific, and the Middle East and North Africa. Despite a number of success stories, Sub-Saharan Africa's progress has been limited by democratic backsliding in Central and Eastern Africa, and it remains the region facing the greatest challenges for electoral integrity.¹⁸

In terms of the issues, campaign finance continues to be a major challenge worldwide, with the lowest scores on this sub-dimension of electoral integrity in every region.¹⁹ Inequity in campaign finance plays a particularly problematic role in elections in Sub-Saharan Africa, undermining the better developed aspects of electoral processes in the region, such as the vote count, electoral procedures, and results.

Across the regions, 19 new elections were added to the PEI dataset in the first half of 2017. Figure 6 shows the overall electoral integrity score for each of the 19 elections. These elections vary considerably in their PEI index scores, ranging from the Netherlands, evaluated highly by the expert survey, through to Turkmenistan, which was lowest. Of these 19 elections, six case studies are presented in detail, selected from those that received high, moderate and low electoral integrity scores, respectively.

The case studies demonstrate the dynamics of various aspects of electoral malpractice common to countries across the different regions and levels of development. This is evident in the voter registration sub-dimension in particular. The greatest disparity between Sub-Saharan Africa and the better-performing regions is on voter registration, although as shown in Figure 5, and as the case-study of France demonstrates, this stage can pose significant problems for developed democracies as well. The nature of the issues may vary, but the essential problems associated with disenfranchisement, as well as the available solutions, share much in common across the world.

Figure 6: The PEI Index for elections, 1 Jan-30 June 2017




Note: Bars show the mean score on the PEI-5.5 Index (0-100) for elections conducted January 1 to June 30, 2017.

Source: PEI 5.5, election-level.

Northern and Western Europe: France

Every country in Northern and Western Europe was rated by the PEI experts as having ‘high’ or ‘very high’ levels of electoral integrity, although there is considerable variation within the region on both overall scores and on the sub-dimensions. About three quarters of these countries were rated by the experts as having ‘very high’ levels of electoral integrity, led by those in the north.

Figure 7: Nordic states lead in electoral integrity



Source: PEI 5.5, country-level

The Nordic countries, all affluent, long-standing democracies with party-list proportional representation systems,²⁰ continue to lead the field in electoral integrity. Denmark, Finland, Norway, Iceland and Sweden comprise five of the top six globally. These countries all score highly across the sub-dimensions of electoral integrity, although there is room for improvement in the media coverage and campaign finance domains, as is the case for many other nations in the dataset.

Spain, Italy, Greece, the UK and Malta performed moderately well overall, with ‘high’ levels of electoral integrity, although they received relatively low scores on electoral laws compared to other countries in the region. Among these countries, campaign finance, district boundaries, and media coverage issues were also rated as more problematic than in Northern Europe. Within this region, the case of France demonstrates that even the highest-performing electoral systems are affected by issues of electoral integrity.

France – presidential (23rd April and 7th May, 2017) and parliamentary (11th and 18th June, 2017) elections

France, a new addition to the PEI index, was rated as ‘very high’ in both the Presidential and Legislative elections it held in 2017. The first of its two presidential election rounds was held on the 23rd of April, 2017, with a turnout of 78%.²¹ Incumbent Socialist Party President, François Hollande, declined to run for re-election amid poor polling.²² His former Minister, Emmanuel Macron, founded the centrist En Marche! Party in April 2016, which quickly gained popularity.²³ No candidate secured a majority in the first round: Macron (24%); Le Pen (21.3%); Fillon (20%); Mélenchon (19.6%), requiring a run-off second round between the top two candidates, Macron and Le Pen. The second round on the 7th of May, 2017, saw Macron win decisively with nearly two-thirds of the vote (66.1%). Turnout fell slightly in the second round to 75%.²⁴

The presidential election was followed by the French legislative elections, held on the 11th and 18th of June, 2017. The 577 members of the National Assembly are elected in single-member constituencies to serve five-year terms. In the first round, candidates who receive an absolute majority of valid votes, and a vote total equal to 25% of the registered electorate, are elected. If no candidate reaches this threshold, a runoff is held among candidates who received at least 12.5% of the electorate’s votes, where the candidate who receives the most votes is elected.²⁵ Four seats were won in the first round, including two for Macron’s En Marche!.²⁶

In the second round, En Marche! won 306 of the remaining 573 National Assembly seats up for election with 43.1% of the vote, giving them a total of 308 and a parliamentary majority.²⁷ After aligning with the Democratic Movement party, they together formed a centrist majority of 350 seats.²⁸ The incumbent Socialist Party lost many seats,


decreasing from 280 in 2012 to 30 in 2017. The Republicans won 112 seats, falling from 194 in 2012. The National Front increased their share of seats, from 2 in 2012, to 8 in 2017.²⁹

The PEI expert evaluations of electoral integrity places France 18th out of 161 countries, with an overall score of 75. Although France was evaluated positively overall, there remain areas of concern. France registered the lowest score in the region on the voting results sub-dimension, and also received poor evaluations on voter registration in comparison to other aspects of the electoral cycle. Voter turnout in the legislative elections also raises concern, at 49% in the first round and 43% in the second.³⁰ The decline in voter turnout is the continuation of a long-term trend, albeit one that increased in the most recent election (see Figure 8).

Cross-nationally, voter turnout is generally positively associated with electoral integrity.³¹ A recent study on the 2012 French presidential and parliamentary elections found that French voter registration laws depressed voter turnout.³² In particular, self-initiated registration led to the exclusion of French citizens who would otherwise vote. An automatic voter registration policy would likely increase both overall voter turnout as well as the social and ethnic representativeness of the electoral rolls and the actual vote.³³


Both the legislative and presidential elections took place under the formal state of emergency instituted following the November 15, 2015, terrorist attacks in Paris. Human rights groups have criticized the state of emergency for restricting the right to protest peacefully.³⁴ The presidential campaign was interrupted by an attack targeting police officers on the Champs-Élysées three days before the first round of voting.³⁵ These events, coupled with the ongoing European migrant crisis, have fueled support for the populist anti-immigration National Front, who have capitalised on public anxiety about these issues.³⁶

Figure 8: Declining voter turnout in French National Assembly elections



Source: International IDEA Voter Turnout Database

The Americas: Ecuador

Electoral integrity in The Americas

■ Very High/High ■ Moderate ■ Low/Very Low

The Americas region is home to some of the best and the worst of global electoral integrity. This includes cases such as Costa Rica (PEI rank: 5th) and Nicaragua (PEI rank: 142nd), where countries in the highest and lowest categories of electoral integrity share a border. Nearly half of all countries in this region are evaluated as having either ‘high’ or ‘very high’ levels of electoral integrity, while 10 rate as moderate, 4 as low, and 2 as very low.

With its history of revolutionary waves and military coups, populist authoritarianism in Latin America is closely watched. Concerns about contagion effects and the spread of electorally effective malpractices give added weight to the results of these elections and the integrity of their electoral processes.³⁷ Campaign finance, a problem around the world, is particularly pronounced in the Americas.

Source: PEI 5.5, country-level

Ecuador – presidential election, 19 February and 2 April, 2017

The case of Ecuador’s 2017 presidential election has been chosen both for its broader importance to the region as well as its demonstration of some of the core persistent regional threats to electoral integrity. Specifically, it highlights the complex relationship between electoral integrity and electoral legitimacy and the difficulty of establishing trust in electoral institutions given a history of malpractices.³⁸

These conditions are probably exacerbated by winner-take-all presidential electoral systems in Ecuador that provide few incentives for inter-party cooperation,³⁹ but much can be attributed to periodic breakdowns in the development of electoral norms. By contrast other states in the region have emerged to become stable multi-party democracies. Chile, as well as both of Ecuador’s neighbors, Colombia and Peru, now rate as having ‘high’ levels of electoral integrity.

Ecuador’s backsliding underscores the importance not only of electoral integrity, but of the consolidation of democratic and electoral norms.

Ecuador’s transition from military junta rule to democracy has been marked by states of emergency, crises, and attempted coups d’état.⁴⁰ The modern Republic of Ecuador has a unicameral National Assembly comprising 137 seats, with both its members and the President serving 4-year terms.⁴¹ Having already served two full terms, PAIS Alliance incumbent Rafael Correa was ineligible for re-election, leaving his former Vice President Lenín Moreno to run.⁴² Correa, elected on a populist anti-party platform, presided over a sweeping crackdown on civil society, free speech, and free press,⁴³ raising concerns that his ‘legacy of democratic erosion might last longer than his rule’.⁴⁴

On the 19th of February, 2017, Ecuador held elections for a new President and National Assembly. Moreno gained 39.4% of the vote, just shy of the 40% threshold required to avoid a run-off second round between the two candidates with the largest number of votes, Moreno and Guillermo Lasso of the Creating Opportunities party, who had received 28.1% of the vote.⁴⁵ In the National Assembly, 116 members are directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority, 15 members are directly elected in a nationwide constituency by proportional

representation, and 6 are directly elected in multi-seat constituencies for Ecuadorians living abroad by simple majority vote.⁴⁶ Moreno's PAIS Alliance party secured 74 seats, the Creating Opportunities Movement won 34, the Social Christian Party won 15, and a number of smaller parties gained less than 5 seats each.⁴⁷

The second round of the presidential election, held on the 2nd of April, 2017, followed a protracted campaign dominated by discussion of the stagnant economy and corruption scandals.⁴⁸ Despite some poll predictions of a Lasso victory,⁴⁹ and exit poll reports,⁵⁰ he fell short with 48.8% to Moreno's 51.2%. With 98% of the votes counted, Lasso demanded a recount, citing fraud, and many of his supporters gathered in front of the Election Commission chanting "fraud", while Moreno's supporters took to the streets to celebrate.⁵¹

Lasso was widely quoted in international media, stating: "I'm warning the world that in Ecuador procedures are being violated, and they're trying to swear in an illegitimate government... This is a clumsy fraud attempt".⁵² Lasso took to Twitter, demanding a recount and calling on the Organization of American States (OAS) to investigate. The National Electoral Council (CNE) recount of 10% of the votes confirmed Moreno's victory, but Lasso dismissed the partial recount as a 'show'.⁵³ The OAS Electoral Observation Mission ultimately "observed no interruption or manipulation whatsoever of the results".⁵⁴

The OAS Electoral Observation Mission (EOM) did, however, register a number of concerns about both rounds of the Ecuadorian elections that "created a climate of mistrust and uncertainty with respect to the transparency of the elections". Specifically, they drew attention to the fact that the CREO-SUMA coalition had begun undermining electoral institutions before the election occurred by suggesting that if Lasso did not win this would indicate fraud. This prompted the EOM to warn that "delegitimizing an electoral process without any grounds erodes democracy and institutions and polarizes society."⁵⁵ The OAS/EOM also reports a number of genuine reasons for Lasso supporters to feel that the playing field was uneven, including unequal access to the media, the use of government resources to promote the PAIS Alliance ticket, weak legislation on the use of state resources during the campaign, and voter registration issues, including complaints about inadequate preparation of the electoral roll and the registration of deceased individuals.⁵⁶

Many of these issues are reflected in the expert reports. At the election-level there has been an 11-point drop in the PEI index between the 2013 and 2017 elections, tracking with Freedom House's downgrade of Ecuador's civil liberties rating during this period.⁵⁷

Figure 9: Ecuador's declining electoral integrity


	PEI Index	Electoral laws	Electoral procedures	District boundaries	Voter registration	Party registration	Media coverage	Campaign finance	Voting process	Vote count	Results	Electoral authorities
2017	44	31	51	39	40	51	41	34	57	49	35	39
2013	55	42	65	39	59	57	43	38	63	68	68	52
Change	-11	-11	-14	0	-19	-6	-2	-4	-5	-19	-33	-14

Source: PEI 5.5, election-level

The sharp declines on the voter registration, vote count, and results sub-dimensions, shown in Figure 9, as well as the very poor scores on electoral laws and campaign finance, reflect the key takeaways of this case. Both abuses of power and delegitimization of institutions undermine electoral integrity, and they are often reciprocal. When stakeholders' trust in institutions has been degraded by electoral malpractices, they will often pursue non-institutional means of achieving their goals. International observer missions, such as the OAS EOMs, may assist in mitigating this democratic downwards spiral, by providing much-needed legitimacy, impartiality, and information diffusion, but their efficacy is dependent upon stakeholder engagement.⁵⁸

Central and Eastern Europe: Serbia

Electoral integrity in Central and Eastern Europe



■ Very High/High ■ Moderate ■ Low/Very Low

The 28 Central and Eastern European states showed major contrasts in the quality of their elections so that Estonia performed well, while Turkmenistan languishes at the bottom of the states. Serbia illustrates a case which continues to face significant electoral integrity issues that have stunted its democratic development.

Serbia – presidential election, 2 April 2017

In Serbia, the President is elected with a two-round system to serve a 5-year term. In the 2017 presidential election, however, Aleksandar Vučić, of the conservative Serbian Progressive Party, won 55.1% of the first-round vote, and so there was no requirement for a second round. Vučić’s nearest competitor, Independent Saša Janković, secured 16.4% of the vote.⁵⁹

Vučić previously served as the secretary-general of the far right nationalist Serbian Radical Party, becoming de facto deputy leader when Vojislav Šešelj was put on trial for war crimes.⁶⁰

He also served as Minister of Information in the government

of Slobodan Milošević,⁶¹ presiding over widespread media suppression, ranging from outlet and issue bans, fines, censorship, and threats to outright arrest and detention of journalists.⁶² Serbia’s recent electoral history has similarly been marred by concerns over media freedoms.

Following the 2016 parliamentary elections, the OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission (LEOM) reported that media bias and abuse of state resources unduly advantaged the incumbent.⁶³ Freedom House subsequently downgraded Serbia’s political rights rating from 2 to 3 following reports of ballot-stuffing and other electoral irregularities, as well as the Vučić government’s continued crackdown on critical and free press.⁶⁴ The OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Report on the 2017 election again reported that journalists were targeted with intimidation, including death threats, and violence. The media environment was characterized by rife self-censorship and coverage that was heavily biased in favor of the government. These conditions limited voter access to impartial information about its record.⁶⁵


Figure 10: Media coverage key concern in Serbian 2017 Presidential election

PEI Index	Electoral laws	Electoral procedures	District boundaries	Voter registration	Party registration	Media coverage	Campaign finance	Voting process	Vote count	Results	Electoral authorities
43	46	52	58	26	49	17	30	53	52	40	40

Source: PEI 5.5, election-level

As shown in Figures 10 and 11, the observers’ concerns are echoed by the PEI expert ratings. While Serbia’s country-level PEI index score is 48, at this most recent election their PEI score was 43, driven in large part by a decline on the media coverage sub-dimension from scores in the mid-30s at the past two legislative elections to 17 at the 2017 presidential election. These events prompted the New York Times editorial board to write: “With Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić’s decisive victory in the presidential election on April 2, Serbia has edged closer to autocracy... Having severely curtailed press freedom and marginalized political opposition, this concentration of power bodes ill for Serbian democracy.”⁶⁶

Figure 11: Serbia’s media sub-dimension scores in regional context




Note: Countries ordered from left to right by overall media integrity score. Scale: 1-5 (Strongly disagree – Strongly agree).

Source: PEI 5.5, country-level.

Figure 11 breaks down the country-level PEI scores on the four media index questions that deal with the veracity and balance of newspaper coverage, TV coverage, overall coverage by journalists, and fairness of party/candidate access to political broadcasts and advertising. Serbia ranks 24th out of 28 countries in a region that ranks second lowest globally in this domain. Serbia’s media integrity is in the bottom eighth of countries globally. The 2017 rotating battery of questions provides further insights, although comparisons are limited to countries that have held elections in the first half of 2017. Of these 18 countries, Serbia was reported as having the highest levels of ‘fake news’ and its levels of factual accuracy in reporting of the government’s record were lower than all countries other than authoritarian Turkmenistan.

Voter registration was also identified by both the observer mission and the PEI experts as a major problem, with the LEOM recommending: removing the blanket disenfranchisement of citizens declared legally incapable; addressing voter list inaccuracies, such as the presence of deceased persons on the voter lists; and making voter lists, or partial lists, available for public scrutiny.⁶⁷ But these concerns pale in comparison to the extreme dysfunction and suppression of Serbia’s campaign press. While the government controls the information available to voters about the government’s record, its plans for the future, and the competing agendas of opposition parties, elections in Vučić’s Serbia can be neither free nor fair.

The Asia-Pacific: Timor-Leste

Electoral integrity in the Asia-Pacific

Source: PEI 5.5, country-level

■ Very High/High ■ Moderate ■ Low/Very Low

One third of the 30 countries in the Asia-Pacific region were rated as having either ‘very high’ (New Zealand, Taiwan, Republic of Korea, and Australia) or ‘high’ levels of electoral integrity. Nearly half of Asia-Pacific countries scored in the ‘moderate’ range, while one country was rated as ‘low’ and five as ‘very low’.

2017 saw the inclusion of Timor-Leste into the PEI index for the first time, illustrating some of the unique challenges facing new democracies.

Timor-Leste – presidential election, 20 March, 2017

Timor-Leste’s President is elected for a 5-year term by absolute majority in a two-round system with a threshold of 50% plus one vote.⁶⁸ Francisco Guterres of the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN) won the 20 March, 2017, election with 57.1% of the vote in the first round, and so a second round was not required. The other major candidate, António da Conceição, of the centre-left Democratic Party, gained 32.5% of the vote. No other candidate achieved more than 3% of the vote.⁶⁹ Voter turnout (71.2%) was only slightly lower than the previous presidential election in 2012 (73.1%)

after substantial drops from the elections immediately following Timorese independence in 2002 (97.3%) and 2007 (81%).⁷⁰


Guterres’ victory in 2017, followed his losses to José Ramos-Horta in 2007 and Taur Matan in 2012.^{71,72} Incumbent Matan opted not to run for a second presidential term, in favor of a bid for the prime ministership, the dominant seat of executive power within Timor’s semi-presidential system.⁷³ Following the formation of a national unity government in February 2015,⁷⁴ analysts have raised concerns that this has reduced the expression of dissent and government accountability, “forfeiting a major purpose of the central institution of democratic life.”⁷⁵ Others hold that the unity government demonstrates a commitment to democratic solidarity beyond partisan differences.⁷⁶ Matan has been a notable opposing voice,⁷⁷ criticising the pact as benefiting ruling elites at the people’s expense.⁷⁸

The PEI experts evaluated the 2017 presidential election in Timor-Leste as having high integrity (PEI Index score: 61; rank: 57), aligning with the Australia Timor-Leste Observer Mission’s (ATLEOM) conclusion that it “substantively met the criteria for being free and fair”⁷⁹ and the EU observers’ characterization of the election as “well-run and peaceful”.⁸⁰ Yet Timor-Leste performed particularly poorly on the campaign finance sub-dimension. ATLEOM noted the issue of late passage of legislation affected the provision of electoral finances, while the EU observers stressed the absence of campaign spending limits and the consequent disparity between the financing of Guterres’ campaign and his less well-resourced opponents.⁸¹

Timor-Leste also faced issues with voter registration, with ATLEOM raising questions about the accuracy of the voter lists as well as a number of more minor pre-election organization and technical administration issues. Of particular concern, the absence of a postal vote and logistical limitations on overseas voting led to a registration rate of only around five percent among the estimated 25,000 Timorese citizens situated overseas.⁸²

Despite these drawbacks, Timor-Leste’s 2017 presidential election marks another important step towards long-term political stability and the consolidation of robust multi-party democracy.⁸³

The Middle East and North Africa: Algeria

Electoral integrity in the Middle East and North Africa

■ Very High/High ■ Moderate ■ Low/Very Low

Most states in the Middle East and North Africa are classed as having either ‘very low’ (Bahrain and Syria) or ‘low’ (Jordan, Iran, Turkey, Algeria, Iraq, and Egypt) levels of electoral integrity. Two countries rated as ‘moderate’ (Morocco and Kuwait), two as ‘high’ (Tunisia and Oman), and one as ‘very high’ (Israel).

Algeria returned to the polls in 2017 in what was widely seen as a test of landmark constitutional reforms adopted in 2016.⁸⁴


Algeria – parliamentary election, 4 May, 2017

In Algeria’s People’s National Assembly, 462 members are elected by proportional representation from 48 multi-member constituencies based on provinces for a five-year term.⁸⁵ The National Liberation Front (FLN) won 164 of the 462 seats of the National Assembly, followed by National Democratic Rally with 97, HMS Alliance with 33, Tajamoua Emel El Djazair with 19, and Nadha-Adala-Bina with 15. The remaining seats were won by thirty minor parties, with 28 won by independents.⁸⁶

UN Secretary-general António Guterres congratulated the people and Government of Algeria for conducting a peaceful election,⁸⁷ but the African Union Election Observer Mission reported concerns about boycotts and voter apathy leading to high abstention rates.⁸⁸ Despite a government campaign intended to increase voter interest and turnout with the slogan “Make your voice heard”,⁸⁹ turnout was a mere 37.1%. This is lower than the long-term average and down 6% from the last parliamentary elections in 2012, but slightly above the record low of 35.5% in 2007.⁹⁰ However, counting the record 24.5% of votes that were invalid,⁹¹ IFES calculated voter turnout to be as low as 28%.⁹² In part this may be explained by very low levels of trust in Algeria’s politicians, but also perceptions of electoral malpractice specifically. A recent report of 2016 Arab Barometer data found that only 9% of Algerians reported the previous parliamentary elections to be “completely free and fair”; 19% reported that they were “free and fair with minor problems”; 13% “free and fair with major problems”; 36% “not free or fair”; and 22% did not know.⁹³

Expert reports support these public perceptions of widespread electoral malpractice. Despite some formal advancement with the creation of the High Independent Commission for Election Oversight (HIISE),⁹⁴ Algeria continues to perform poorly on every electoral integrity sub-dimension. Among other areas of concern, Ministry of the Interior control over party registration, jailing of journalists for criticism of public officials or state bodies, punishment of dissent and suppression of freedom of assembly contribute to an overall PEI score of 44, placing Algeria in the bottom quartile (128th) globally.⁹⁵ Censorship and a political order controlled by ruling party and military elites severely harm the legitimacy of elections in Algeria, and this is reflected in the public’s low levels of civic participation and engagement with electoral processes.⁹⁶

Sub-Saharan Africa: The Gambia

Electoral integrity in Sub-Saharan Africa

■ Very High/High ■ Moderate ■ Low/Very Low

Source: PEI 5.5, country-level

Of the 42 Sub-Saharan African states in PEI 5.5, two (Cape Verde and Benin) are rated as having ‘very high’ levels of electoral integrity, while six are rated as ‘high’, 11 as ‘moderate’, and twenty-three as ‘low’ or ‘very low’. Many of the poorest-performing countries in the region are either under, or emerging from, authoritarian rule, which brings its own unique challenges. Elections in The Gambia highlight many of the common obstacles faced by countries in the early stages of democratic transition.

The Gambia – parliamentary election, 6 April 2017

The highly anticipated 2017 parliamentary election in The Gambia consolidated and extended upon the late-2016 presidential election, which, though turbulent, saw the first peaceful handover of power since its independence in 1965.⁹⁷ EU observers reported that where the presidential election had paved the way for the transition to democracy, the parliamentary election “reestablished political freedom”.⁹⁸

In The Gambia’s unicameral parliament, the National Assembly, 53 of the 58 seats are decided by simple plurality in single-member constituencies, with elected members serving five-year terms. The remaining 5 members of the National Assembly are directly appointed by the President.⁹⁹ President Adama Barrow’s United Democratic Party won 31 of the 53 seats up for election, with the remaining parties each winning five or fewer.¹⁰⁰

The Gambia’s overall PEI Index score of 50 is the product of both impressive development on the electoral procedures (72), vote count (71) and electoral authorities (69) sub-dimensions, and profound problems in other areas, most notably campaign finance (26), electoral laws (35), media coverage (38) and voter registration (38). The decision to re-use the presidential election voter roll disenfranchised thousands of Gambians who came of voting age between the 2016 and 2017 elections. The EU observer mission also noted issues with the circumscription of voting rights for citizens that have committed electoral offences or served more than six months in jail and the failure to follow through on the Elections Act provision requiring the maintenance of a register of Gambian expatriates.¹⁰¹

Other major issues for Gambian electoral integrity include the unduly burdensome party registration process and the very large disparities in electoral boundaries. In the most extreme case, one Gambian electorate contains more than 20 times as many voters as another,¹⁰² contrary to the principles of universal and equal suffrage enshrined in the UDHR and ICCPR. The lack of campaign finance regulation, monitoring, and enforcement further skews the playing field, though in the absence of regulations governing disclosure it is difficult to identify precisely how much.¹⁰³

Despite these issues, after decades of authoritarian rule, this election was both peaceful and a genuine contest. The press, while logistically limited in their ability to hold the government to account and dominated by the President’s nationwide tour, provided multiple viewpoints and operated free from sanction or censorship. The ongoing liberalisation of the media is heading in the right direction, although still has a long way to go.¹⁰⁴ For a country whose electoral environment has historically been characterised by violence and outright fraud,¹⁰⁵ the electoral malpractices that have persevered are comparatively mild.

IV: SUB-DIMENSIONS OF ELECTORAL INTEGRITY BY COUNTRY

Rank	Country	Type	PEI Index	Electoral Laws	Electoral procedures	District boundaries	Voter registration	Party registration	Media coverage	Campaign finance	Voting process	Vote count	Results	Electoral authorities
1	Denmark	Leg.	86	91	98	84	94	90	72	72	79	98	94	93
2	Finland	Leg.	86	80	98	71	95	93	70	70	83	99	96	96
3	Norway	Leg.	83	81	92	70	86	84	68	73	81	97	92	91
4	Iceland	Both	83	79	88	70	92	85	67	71	84	96	91	89
5	Costa Rica	Pres.	81	80	97	64	74	79	57	65	82	99	95	97
6	Sweden	Leg.	80	79	90	75	87	80	61	66	79	93	88	94
7	Germany	Leg.	80	77	89	73	82	83	67	70	78	94	88	84
8	Netherlands*	Leg.	80	92	90	70	85	80	68	66	74	89	90	88
9	Estonia	Leg.	79	75	84	70	87	75	68	58	89	87	86	83
10	Switzerland	Leg.	79	77	89	72	88	82	63	41	82	93	92	91
11	Lithuania	Both	78	87	82	76	78	85	67	64	73	87	83	79
12	Austria	Both	78	82	81	74	80	75	64	68	80	90	77	82
13	Slovenia	Both	76	73	83	62	90	73	59	63	80	93	78	86
14	Czech Rep.	Both	76	81	85	72	88	78	57	59	69	93	85	83
15	Uruguay	Pres.	75	91	94	69	78	72	65	58	56	92	94	84
16	New Zealand	Leg.	75	71	95	64	54	83	54	56	79	86	88	88
17	Canada	Leg.	75	51	90	78	57	74	63	68	73	89	86	89
18	France*	Both	75	69	93	68	64	76	63	67	71	91	73	85
19	Slovak Rep.	Both	74	71	84	64	79	81	65	56	71	87	85	80
20	Portugal	Both	74	77	89	65	49	79	57	62	72	92	88	85
21	Poland	Both	74	79	85	73	75	75	53	61	74	85	82	81
22	Israel	Leg.	74	76	92	66	78	76	58	61	58	90	87	87
23	Taiwan	Pres.	73	65	94	65	84	83	61	51	54	94	86	88
24	Rep. of Korea*	Both	73	53	87	62	81	70	56	64	75	90	81	83
25	Latvia	Leg.	71	72	83	68	66	72	60	55	69	88	77	78
26	Belgium	Leg.	71	66	81	60	77	73	64	64	67	79	79	77
27	Ireland	Leg.	71	77	90	70	32	82	60	57	60	89	86	77
28	Cape Verde	Both	71	80	87	60	60	73	68	55	64	80	81	78
29	Australia	Leg.	70	65	89	72	59	74	46	53	72	82	74	88
30	Cyprus	Both	70	71	86	66	71	66	53	49	67	86	86	78
31	Benin	Both	70	85	82	77	53	70	66	39	59	90	77	87
32	Spain	Leg.	69	40	84	58	75	74	50	53	63	91	91	81
33	Brazil	Pres.	68	74	87	75	77	62	48	38	66	92	63	82
34	Japan	Leg.	68	55	84	54	75	68	54	59	64	82	78	75
35	Tunisia	Both	68	77	81	72	49	73	57	47	63	83	71	78
36	Tonga	Leg.	67	70	67	73	58	75	56	44	68	85	64	77
37	Chile	Pres.	67	54	89	59	55	65	53	48	53	89	90	88
38	Jamaica	Leg.	67	72	87	68	59	73	61	45	46	85	76	82
39	Italy	Leg.	66	44	86	65	73	66	53	49	63	80	76	79
40	Greece	Leg.	66	47	91	54	66	65	51	45	59	87	87	81
41	United Kingdom*	Leg.	66	40	86	46	51	69	43	55	73	88	76	80
42	Grenada	Leg.	66	62	93	54	53	80	41	22	57	92	92	88
43	Ghana	Pres.	65	80	71	66	53	81	63	39	54	85	65	73
44	Malta*	Leg.	65	49	85	53	67	67	43	38	64	88	81	78
45	Croatia	Both	65	62	75	50	54	63	50	56	62	83	84	72
46	Argentina	Leg.	65	69	78	64	66	70	55	39	62	74	76	67
47	Mongolia	Both	64	53	73	57	64	64	54	43	64	88	72	70

Rank	Country	Type	PEI Index	Electoral Laws	Electoral procedures	District boundaries	Voter registration	Party registration	Media coverage	Campaign finance	Voting process	Vote count	Results	Electoral authorities
48	Mauritius	Leg.	64	64	90	53	71	60	47	32	58	87	77	78
49	Rwanda	Leg.	64	62	71	62	71	60	54	59	61	71	78	65
50	South Africa	Leg.	63	73	78	68	51	60	56	35	62	75	72	71
51	Barbados	Leg.	63	67	69	66	55	58	64	31	57	82	79	71
52	Vanuatu	Leg.	62	75	69	58	25	72	68	39	57	73	72	78
53	Peru	Both	62	64	50	63	73	59	53	44	63	84	75	63
54	Lesotho*	Leg.	62	78	78	69	47	62	51	37	52	78	72	76
55	United States	Both	61	36	72	14	40	78	60	48	68	79	69	72
56	Oman	Leg.	61	53	80	51	58	58	53	40	63	74	78	59
57	Timor-Leste*	Pres.	61	66	75	50	53	63	50	35	58	76	78	70
58	Bhutan	Leg.	61	52	75	61	46	45	66	57	57	66	68	74
59	Panama	Pres.	61	55	78	54	65	65	54	24	63	75	64	71
60	Namibia	Pres.	60	67	62	71	52	70	51	35	56	65	79	68
61	Colombia	Both	60	64	75	63	42	64	50	38	48	79	73	76
62	Georgia	Both	60	61	70	54	55	55	52	41	57	76	73	66
63	Micronesia*	Leg.	59	65	65	67	42	69	51	37	59	70	65	66
64	India	Leg.	59	72	72	56	39	57	55	33	53	72	67	76
65	Botswana	Leg.	58	37	83	48	59	67	36	16	63	75	77	75
66	Bulgaria*	Both	58	61	64	60	42	65	45	40	53	75	68	64
67	Mexico	Both	57	54	71	64	68	53	50	39	51	79	50	64
68	Morocco	Leg.	57	73	70	65	43	50	60	42	42	74	71	55
69	Sierra Leone	Pres.	57	67	78	50	70	63	31	32	56	62	64	72
70	Maldives	Both	57	59	69	53	48	59	52	40	56	66	72	52
71	Cuba	Leg.	57	29	76	40	78	59	39	42	53	67	88	56
72	Ivory Coast	Both	57	66	73	45	51	62	44	34	52	75	66	64
73	Indonesia	Both	57	61	62	64	40	65	53	34	56	69	54	67
74	Solomon Is.	Leg.	57	74	67	72	41	59	61	29	40	72	63	68
75	Hungary	Leg.	56	30	69	30	69	58	32	38	65	80	73	58
76	Bolivia	Pres.	56	55	63	54	45	61	54	33	57	62	70	54
77	Moldova	Both	56	51	64	58	50	57	42	33	57	79	59	61
78	Romania	Both	56	49	64	49	33	60	41	44	52	76	74	61
79	Paraguay	Pres.	55	63	70	61	46	54	40	24	51	74	79	57
80	Albania*	Leg.	55	46	65	55	63	51	49	34	47	71	75	57
81	Guinea-Bissau	Pres.	55	63	67	52	50	55	57	31	50	65	58	60
82	Kyrgyzstan	Leg.	54	54	64	58	43	43	52	38	52	70	65	59
83	Myanmar	Leg.	54	42	72	54	30	40	49	34	55	74	69	69
84	El Salvador	Both	54	56	62	59	49	60	47	35	54	67	48	58
85	Kuwait	Leg.	54	38	69	48	60	56	51	26	56	71	53	59
86	Belize	Leg.	54	41	65	41	43	59	53	29	52	70	65	69
87	Bahamas*	Leg.	54	43	60	42	37	45	58	47	49	69	72	61
88	Samoa	Leg.	54	33	67	58	40	53	58	31	51	70	60	66
89	Burkina Faso	Both	53	63	71	44	47	53	61	26	39	72	60	65
90	Nigeria	Leg.	53	75	66	63	42	60	49	20	31	73	68	70
91	Guyana	Leg.	53	43	77	50	61	63	36	30	48	66	45	74
92	Nepal	Leg.	53	73	63	55	44	58	52	35	42	66	46	65
93	Fiji	Leg.	53	30	72	50	58	49	37	32	62	64	59	63
94	S. Tome & Princ.	Both	53	64	72	53	45	58	41	27	47	64	61	62
95	Central Afr. Rep.	Pres.	53	66	52	42	33	44	58	49	45	66	69	56
96	Mali	Pres.	53	62	61	50	25	50	54	39	45	69	67	58
97	Singapore	Leg.	52	27	77	14	75	46	33	35	60	69	75	58

Rank	Country	Type	PEI Index	Electoral Laws	Electoral procedures	District boundaries	Voter registration	Party registration	Media coverage	Campaign finance	Voting process	Vote count	Results	Electoral authorities
98	Niger	Pres.	52	75	56	71	37	43	44	30	50	74	43	66
99	Bosnia	Pres.	52	39	68	41	49	42	44	35	51	66	72	65
100	Sri Lanka	Both	52	58	70	49	48	49	38	24	47	68	58	68
101	Philippines	Both	51	57	64	53	33	62	54	22	44	68	52	61
102	Montenegro	Both	51	64	57	58	39	60	44	25	51	67	55	46
103	Ukraine	Both	51	56	59	49	39	52	48	32	50	58	62	56
104	Thailand	Leg.	51	76	43	69	57	54	47	48	49	59	34	34
105	Suriname	Leg.	50	47	65	49	47	61	39	26	49	57	64	53
106	The Gambia*	Both	50	35	72	48	38	53	38	26	45	71	55	69
107	Pakistan	Leg.	50	68	57	51	53	38	59	36	37	62	45	60
108	Ecuador*	Pres.	50	37	58	39	49	54	42	36	60	58	51	46
109	Jordan	Leg.	49	38	68	35	46	58	50	32	46	56	47	64
110	Iran*	Both	49	29	67	43	58	27	47	36	52	58	71	52
111	Serbia*	Both	48	47	60	55	32	53	30	34	53	61	55	50
112	Malawi	Pres.	48	70	50	60	30	69	49	18	42	50	44	55
113	Macedonia	Both	48	46	56	50	28	56	33	31	50	66	52	51
114	Guatemala	Pres.	48	46	62	60	32	38	41	19	36	76	63	67
115	Turkey	Both	47	31	63	45	52	48	27	26	47	67	68	50
116	Armenia*	Both	47	53	47	59	40	54	53	30	41	60	47	46
117	Laos	Leg.	47	15	66	53	57	41	25	40	44	57	84	39
118	Cameroon	Leg.	46	47	59	37	43	49	39	23	37	67	52	63
119	Comoros	Both	46	68	47	54	28	54	51	26	32	66	45	46
120	Kazakhstan	Both	45	32	53	50	51	37	32	35	50	55	63	42
121	Swaziland	Leg.	45	24	64	29	48	32	47	37	45	63	56	49
122	Honduras	Pres.	45	38	50	43	39	60	36	29	48	70	30	45
123	Venezuela	Both	45	38	49	42	48	59	31	23	51	53	60	40
124	Zambia	Pres.	45	57	52	59	37	52	31	27	39	54	44	53
125	Russia	Leg.	44	35	43	48	52	43	33	34	54	40	64	40
126	Dominican Rep.	Pres.	44	43	50	58	55	49	39	18	45	54	39	45
127	Mauritania	Both	44	51	47	46	26	43	49	31	44	52	41	52
128	Algeria*	Both	44	31	49	47	45	41	44	27	51	54	50	37
129	Iraq	Leg.	44	44	53	39	37	46	46	18	47	50	53	46
130	Tanzania	Pres.	44	33	60	44	33	55	43	23	44	56	39	46
131	Sudan	Pres.	43	28	49	42	37	48	37	26	45	57	59	43
132	Egypt	Both	43	28	55	43	41	39	32	24	49	55	58	42
133	Guinea	Both	42	45	37	40	24	55	47	22	41	57	48	40
134	Kenya	Pres.	41	70	31	50	17	58	62	19	34	37	55	27
135	Madagascar	Pres.	40	36	41	34	19	48	44	20	37	58	45	50
136	Belarus	Both	39	27	44	56	45	41	29	28	47	33	55	31
137	Bangladesh	Leg.	39	42	46	42	46	38	49	23	26	50	40	36
138	Uzbekistan	Both	38	26	53	46	37	27	23	22	42	48	74	29
139	Bahrain	Leg.	38	18	44	21	34	39	36	27	46	51	55	31
140	Togo	Both	38	34	40	28	23	47	48	27	40	39	37	40
141	Uganda	Pres.	37	33	35	29	33	52	42	14	32	55	41	41
142	Nicaragua	Pres.	36	31	40	49	41	36	47	28	32	34	43	26
143	Angola	Leg.	36	28	37	50	22	47	31	22	39	36	43	35
144	Malaysia	Leg.	35	16	43	10	21	48	22	21	57	44	42	32
145	Tajikistan	Both	35	18	44	41	24	28	30	23	38	48	57	35
146	Zimbabwe	Leg.	35	27	29	31	15	50	33	26	36	46	49	32
147	Azerbaijan	Both	35	35	30	46	40	38	24	20	40	40	51	26

Rank	Country	Type	PEI Index	Electoral Laws	Electoral procedures	District boundaries	Voter registration	Party registration	Media coverage	Campaign finance	Voting process	Vote count	Results	Electoral authorities
148	Mozambique	Pres.	35	37	38	42	26	43	34	20	39	32	37	33
149	Turkmenistan*	Both	34	23	45	44	38	26	14	21	35	37	73	28
150	Vietnam	Leg.	34	14	41	36	40	26	20	25	41	39	54	34
151	Gabon	Pres.	34	33	34	34	49	62	26	17	38	34	21	19
152	Afghanistan	Pres.	32	47	24	50	20	32	61	23	29	23	26	26
153	Cambodia	Leg.	32	29	37	31	13	38	28	18	35	57	25	28
154	Haiti	Both	31	41	26	43	24	38	52	17	21	39	24	30
155	Chad	Pres.	31	42	19	46	33	35	26	10	38	34	35	31
156	Djibouti	Both	30	22	35	44	26	24	30	17	33	34	39	28
157	Congo, Rep.	Both	28	22	26	36	18	39	25	11	38	32	34	19
158	Eq. Guinea	Both	26	16	22	39	28	28	13	14	27	29	53	19
159	Burundi	Both	25	29	16	34	17	29	26	11	27	39	23	21
160	Syria	Both	24	9	24	33	17	21	16	10	25	30	63	22
161	Ethiopia	Leg.	24	15	22	38	32	29	22	19	23	18	41	14

Source: The Perceptions of Electoral Integrity expert survey (PEI 5.5), country-level

* = Election held from 1 January to 30 June 2017



V:

"Election Posters, Paris" (CC BY-SA 2.0) by Commonorgarden

TECHNICAL APPENDIX: PERFORMANCE INDICATORS, METHODS AND DATA

Aims: On 1st July 2012 the project launched an expert survey of Perceptions of Electoral Integrity. The method of pooling expert knowledge has been used for years for measuring complex issues, such as to assess the risks of building nuclear plants, levels of corruption, and processes of democratization.

Global Coverage: The PEI survey of electoral integrity covers independent nation-states around the world which have held direct (popular) elections for the national parliament or presidential elections. The criteria for inclusion are listed below. The elections analyzed in this report cover the period from 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2017. In total, PEI 5.5 covers 260 elections in 161 nations.¹⁰⁶

Table A1: Country coverage

Criteria for inclusion in the survey	#	Definition and source
Total number of independent nation-states	194	Membership of the United Nations (plus Taiwan)
Excluded categories		
Micro-states	12	Population less than 100,000 as of 2013: Andorra, Antigua & Barbuda, Dominica, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Monaco, Nauru, Palau, San Marino, Seychelles, St. Kitts and Nevis, and Tuvalu.
Without de jure direct (popular) elections for the lower house of the national legislature	5	Brunei Darussalam, China, Qatar, UAE, and Saudi Arabia
State has constitutional provisions for direct (popular) elections for the lower house of the national legislature, but none have been held since independence or within the last 30 years (<i>de facto</i>)	3	Eritrea, Somalia, and South Sudan
Sub-total of nation-states included in the survey	174	
Covered to date in the PEI 5.5 dataset (from mid-2012 to mid-2017)	161	93% of all nation-states included in the survey

Because of the selection rules, elections contained in each cumulative release of the PEI survey can be treated as a representative cross-section of *all* national presidential and legislative elections around the world (with the exception of the exclusion of micro-states). The countries in PEI 5.5 are broadly similar in political and socio-economic characteristics to those countries holding national elections which are not yet covered in the survey, with the exception of being slightly larger in population size.

Respondents: For each country, the project identified around forty election experts, defined as a political scientist (or other social scientist in a related discipline) who had demonstrated knowledge of the electoral process in a particular country (such as through publications, membership of a relevant research group or network, or university employment). The selection sought a roughly 50:50 balance between international and domestic experts, the latter defined by location or citizenship. In total, 2,961 completed responses were received in the survey, representing just under one third of the experts that the project contacted (29%).

Concepts: The idea of electoral integrity is defined by the project to refer to agreed international conventions and global norms, applying universally to all countries worldwide through the election cycle, including during the pre-election period, the campaign, on polling day, and its aftermath.¹⁰⁷

Measurement: To measure this concept, the PEI survey questionnaire includes 49 items on electoral integrity (see Table A1) ranging over the whole electoral cycle. These items fell into eleven sequential sub-dimensions, as shown. Most attention in detecting fraud focuses upon the final stages of the voting process, such as the role of observers in preventing ballot-stuffing, vote-rigging and manipulated results. Drawing upon the notion of a 'menu of manipulation', however, the concept of an electoral cycle suggests that failure in even one step in the sequence, or one link in the chain, can undermine electoral integrity.¹⁰⁸ The PEI 5.5 Codebook provides detailed description of all

variables and imputation procedures. A copy and all the data can be downloaded from <https://thedata.harvard.edu/dataverse/PEI>.

The electoral integrity items in the survey were recoded so that a higher score consistently represents a more positive evaluation. Missing data was estimated based on multiple imputation of chained equations in groups composing of the eleven sub-dimensions. The Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI) Index is an additive function of the 49 imputed variables, standardized to 100-points. Sub-indices of the eleven sub-dimensions in the electoral cycle are summations of the imputed individual variables.¹⁰⁹

Validity and reliability tests: The results of the pilot study, from the elections held in 2012, were tested for external validity (with independent sources of evidence), internal validity (consistency within the group of experts), and legitimacy (how far the results can be regarded as authoritative by stakeholders). The analysis demonstrated substantial external validity when the PEI data is compared with many other expert datasets, as well as internal validity across the experts within the survey, and legitimacy as measured by levels of congruence between mass and expert opinions within each country.¹¹⁰

For *external* validity tests, the PEI-5.5 Index was significantly correlated with other standard independent indicators contained in the 2017 version of the Quality of Government cross-national dataset. This includes the combined Freedom House/imputed Polity IV measure of democratization ($r=.75^{**}$, N. 159), the Economist Intelligent Unit’s Index of Democracy ($r=.8^{**}$, N. 148), and the Varieties of Democracy measures of electoral democracy (polyarchy) ($r=.82^{**}$, N. 147) and Liberal Democracy ($r=.87^{**}$, N. 147).¹¹¹

For *internal* validity purposes, tests were run using OLS regression models to predict whether the PEI index varied significantly by several socio-demographic, political and experiential characteristics of the experts, including sex, age, education, their level of expertise, and their self-reported ideological position. The sample was broken down by type of regime in the country (using Freedom House’s classification), since a higher proportion of international experts were surveyed in autocracies, where fewer political scientists study elections. The results indicate that the use of domestic or international experts proved significant across all types of regimes, suggesting the importance of relying upon both sources. Political views across the left-right ideological spectrum were significant and positive across all regimes, with experts who located themselves on the right more likely to give favourable assessments. Finally, in democratic states, sex, education, and familiarity with elections also played a role. The relatively modest adjusted R² suggested that the models explained a limited amount of variance in overall scores.

Table A2: Factors predicting expert perceptions of electoral integrity scores

Var	Model A Autocracies (Not Free)				Model B Hybrid (Part Free)				Model C Democracies (Free)							
	B	SE	Beta	P	B	SE	Beta	P	B	SE	Beta	P				
Demographics	sex		(1=female; 0=male)		2.93	1.73	0.08		-0.09	1.07	0.00		-2.70	0.74	-0.10	***
	education		Highest level of education		-0.62	3.57	-0.01		0.72	2.78	0.01		5.49	2.74	0.05	*
	agegroup		Age groups by decade		0.62	0.59	0.05		0.57	0.40	0.05		-0.22	0.28	-0.02	
Expertise	familiarity		How familiar are you with elections in this country?		0.60	0.44	0.06		0.51	0.36	0.05		2.14	0.31	0.20	***
	expertdomestic		Int'l (0) or domestic (1) expert		8.39	1.95	0.24	***	2.62	1.30	0.09	*	2.54	0.92	0.09	**
	lived		# years lived in country		-0.74	0.70	-0.09		-1.04	0.53	-0.13		-0.24	0.43	-0.03	
	born		Were you born in this country?		-2.58	2.55	-0.08		-0.98	1.72	0.03		-1.40	1.08	-0.05	
Political views	leftrightscale		Political views on Left (1) / Right (10) scale		2.04	0.48	0.21	***	0.89	0.29	0.11	**	0.57	0.21	0.07	**
			(Constant)		26.53	18.27			39.61	14.29			21.70	13.69		
			Adjusted R2		0.09				0.01				0.06			
			N.		477				932				1552			

Notes: Regimes classified by Freedom House categories; Dependent Variable: PEI Index of Electoral Integrity, (0-100), imputed. *=.05, **=.01, ***=.001. **Source:** PEI 5.5, expert-level.

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Table A3: PEI Survey Questions

	Sections	Performance indicators	Direction
PRE-ELECTION	1. Electoral laws	1-1 Electoral laws were unfair to smaller parties	N
		1-2 Electoral laws favored the governing party or parties	N
		1-3 Election laws restricted citizens' rights	N
	2. Electoral procedures	2-1 Elections were well managed	P
		2-2 Information about voting procedures was widely available	P
		2-3 Election officials were fair	P
	3. Boundaries	2-4 Elections were conducted in accordance with the law	P
		3-1 Boundaries discriminated against some parties	N
		3-2 Boundaries favored incumbents	N
	4. Voter registration	3-3 Boundaries were impartial	P
		4-1 Some citizens were not listed in the register	N
4-2 The electoral register was inaccurate		N	
5. Party registration	4-3 Some ineligible electors were registered	N	
	5-1 Some opposition candidates were prevented from running	N	
	5-2 Women had equal opportunities to run for office	P	
	5-3 Ethnic and national minorities had equal opportunities to run for office	P	
	5-4 Only top party leaders selected candidates	N	
6. Campaign media	5-5 Some parties/candidates were restricted from holding campaign rallies	N	
	6-1 Newspapers provided balanced election news	P	
	6-2 TV news favored the governing party	N	
	6-3 Parties/candidates had fair access to political broadcasts and advertising	P	
	6-4 Journalists provided fair coverage of the elections	P	
7. Campaign finance	6-5 Social media were used to expose electoral fraud	P	
	7-1 Parties/candidates had equitable access to public subsidies	P	
	7-2 Parties/candidates had equitable access to political donations	P	
	7-3 Parties/candidates publish transparent financial accounts	P	
	7-4 Rich people buy elections	N	
ELECTION DAY	8. Voting process	7-5 Some state resources were improperly used for campaigning	N
		8-1 Some voters were threatened with violence at the polls	N
		8-2 Some fraudulent votes were cast	N
		8-3 The process of voting was easy	P
		8-4 Voters were offered a genuine choice at the ballot box	P
	9. Vote count	8-5 Postal ballots were available	P
		8-6 Special voting facilities were available for the disabled	P
		8-7 National citizens living abroad could vote	P
POST-ELECTION	10. Results	8-8 Some form of internet voting was available	P
		9-1 Ballot boxes were secure	P
		9-2 The results were announced without undue delay	P
	11. Electoral authorities	9-3 Votes were counted fairly	P
		9-4 International election monitors were restricted	N
		9-5 Domestic election monitors were restricted	N
		10-1 Parties/candidates challenged the results	N
2016 ROTATING BATTERY	10. Results	10-2 The election led to peaceful protests	N
		10-3 The election triggered violent protests	N
		10-4 Any disputes were resolved through legal channels	P
		11-1 The election authorities were impartial	P
	11. Electoral authorities	11-2 The authorities distributed information to citizens	P
		11-3 The authorities allowed public scrutiny of their performance	P
		11-4 The election authorities performed well	P
		17-1 Voters were bribed*	N
		17-2 People were free to vote without feeling pressured	P
		17-3 Some voters feared becoming victims of political violence	N
2017 ROTATING BATTERY	11. Electoral authorities	17-4 The process kept the ballot confidential*	P
		17-5 Elections were free and fair	P
		17-6 Some people received cash, gifts or personal favours in exchange for their vote	N
		17-7 Politicians offered patronage to their supporters	N
		18-1 Voting results were subject to a post-election audit	P
2017 ROTATING BATTERY	11. Electoral authorities	18-2 Official election records were safe from hacking	P
		18-3 Most news media reporting about the campaign was factually accurate	P
		18-4 Most news media reporting about the government's record was true to the facts	P
		18-5 Much news was fake	N

Note: Direction of the original items P=positive, N=negative. Source: PEI 5.5

*Rotating item form 2016 repeated in 2017 under same question ID.

VI: BIBLIOGRAPHY OF EIP PUBLICATIONS, ALPHABETICAL ORDER BY AUTHOR

(* affiliated with EIP)










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¹⁰⁶ In addition, in 2014 elections in Haiti, Lebanon, and Comoros were delayed or suspended. Those are thus not included in the dataset. The election in Thailand was held and later annulled. There were also elections in North Korea and Trinidad and Tobago but with too few responses these cases are excluded from the dataset.

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¹⁰⁹ See the codebook for further information. www.electoralintegrityproject.com

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