

# Measuring Authoritarian Populism with Expert Surveys<sup>1</sup>

## Extending CHES estimates on populism and authoritarianism

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### Abstract

For many years, scholars working on populism have dedicated most of their resources studying the supply side of populism and most studies on populism were based on the application of text analysis methods on party manifestos and speeches by party leaders. Only recently, we have seen methods that try to cover both the supply and the demand side of populism by including batteries of items in survey questionnaires suitable for various target groups (voters, candidates and experts).

One of these surveys is the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) which uses the opinion of experts on the positioning of political parties in many countries in Europe. The limitations of CHES are i) the limited scope of the study (covering Europe only), and ii) the CHES questionnaires include only a limited number of questions directly connected to populism and authoritarianism. Finally, for the studies comparing CHES data with data from other surveys, we need to explore the possible implications of the fact that the CHES questions have different structure and wording from the questions used in voter and candidate surveys.

To deal with the first CHES limitation, this paper aims to present the findings of the application of a shortened version of the most recent CHES questionnaire in selected countries in different regions of the world<sup>2</sup>. The first findings indicate that extending CHES in other regions of the world is feasible and can be extremely fruitful, but it seems that not all dimensions included in the CHES questionnaire can travel equally well in other countries.

To deal with the second CHES limitation and to study the possible implications of the different question structures and wordings, this paper presents the findings of a pilot study. The questionnaire of the pilot study includes both CHES and selected items that have already been used in voter and elite surveys. Based on the findings of the pilot study, the paper provides guidelines on what scholars should do when they want to compare the position of the voters of a party (extracted by voter surveys) with the position of the same party extracted by CHES.

### Introduction (Populism and expert surveys)

Scholars working on political science and voting behaviour urgently need to dedicate more resources on the study of populism. It is very easy to justify this necessity: if we just look at almost all recent elections in Europe, we can observe that the populist parties have been among the winners of the elections either by increasing their votes significantly (e.g. France) or by forcing the main parties to adopt their populist rhetoric and agenda (e.g. UK). When these populist parties become larger, win elections and form governments, they usually attack the pillars of liberal democracy. Consequently, we need data that will help us to identify populist parties as early as possible and in any case before they start attacking liberal democracy, i.e. when they are still in opposition. In addition, since

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<sup>1</sup> The paper was prepared for the Electoral Integrity Project (EIP) Seminar Series, University of Sydney, 29 May 2018, while the author was an EIP Visiting Fellow

<sup>2</sup> The current version of the paper covers Europe and Australia. Future versions will cover other regions of the world.

populism is a thin ideology, we need to study the other “fat” or “full fledged” ideologies which are attached to populism in each country and try to explain the mechanism that supports this link.

For many years, scholars working on populism have dedicated most of their resources studying the supply side of populism and most studies on populism were based on the application of text analysis methods on party manifestos and speeches by party leaders. Only recently, we have seen methods that try to cover both the supply and the demand side of populism by including batteries of items in survey questionnaires suitable for various target groups (voters, candidates and experts)<sup>3</sup>.

The findings from the first applications on voter and elite surveys are very promising (see the section “Populism items used in voter and elite surveys”. On the other hand, the potential of using items on populism in expert surveys have not been fully explored yet. To the best of my knowledge, before I submit my research proposal for the project presented in this paper, there were two expert surveys that have used items related to populism: The expert surveys conducted as part of the Team Populism project and the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES)

The expert survey that was conducted as part of the Team Populism project, in addition to a CHES item on anti-elite salience, it includes more populist items (Wiesehomeier, 2017). This study includes measurements fielded in two phases: The first phase was fielded in 2011 / 2012 in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, and Chile and conceives of populism as a bundle of attributes combined in a single metric. The substantive definitions of the scale endpoints asked country experts to locate political parties and presidents along a 20-point scale, where 1 indicated the populist end defined as: “Highlights the interest of the people, with reference to the sovereign will of the majority. Condemns the ruling class and interest groups. Emphasizes personal authority, capable of leadership and a decisive resolution of problems. Uses an informal style and slang.” (1) and 20 indicated the pluralist endpoint as: “Highlights the interests of citizens, with references to civic or republican values. Recognizes the ruling class and interest groups as legitimate. Emphasizes impersonal authority, the formality of procedures and separation of powers. Uses a “well-educated” style and more formal language.” (20). The second expert survey disaggregated the bundle into separate dimensions with concise and straightforward wordings of the endpoints. This survey was implemented in a survey fielded in 2015 in 18 Latin American countries and it includes the following measures:

People-centrism:

Identifies with the common people and celebrates their authenticity (1)

Refers more generally to citizens and their unique interests (20)

Anti-elite: morality

Demonizes and vilifies opponents. (1)

Treats opponents with respect. (20)

Anti-elite: rhetoric (copied by CHES)

Not important at all (1)

Extremely important (20)

Informal style:

Uses an informal style and popular language (1)

Uses a “well-educated” style and more formal language (20)

The main disadvantage of the study conducted by Wiesehomeier is that it covers Latin

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<sup>3</sup>Most of these studies have been conducted as part of the Team Populism project: <https://populism.byu.edu/>

American countries only. In addition, although it has more items related to populism than the 2014 CHES, their structure follow the bi-polar format of the CHES items. Finally, none of these items seem similar to other items used in voter and elite surveys. In any case, due to the similarities to the CHES items, most of the conclusions about CHES presented in this paper should apply to the study conducted by Wiesehomeier.

The 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) is based on the opinion of 337 experts on the positioning of 268 political parties in 31 countries in Europe. The limitations of CHES are: i) the scope of the study (covering Europe only) and ii) the fact that the 2014 CHES questionnaire includes only one item directly connected to populism (salience of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric) and one item that is used by some scholars, as partially connected with populism (salience of reducing political corruption)<sup>4</sup>. All experts were asked to provide salience scores for all parties in a given party system on these two questions; responses could range from 0 (not at all important) to 10 (very important). Both variables are discussed in a publication by the CHES research team (Polk et al., 2017).

One of the most important problems of the 2014 CHES was the lack of any items related to “people centrism” and the prominent idea in the ideology of the populist parties that people (instead of the politicians) should make the most important decisions. In fact, CHES research team seems to have recognized this necessity because in their most recent questionnaire (2017) they have made a step towards this direction by including a new item. The wording of the new item is as follows:

Some political parties take the position that 'the people' should have the final say on the most important issues, for example, by voting directly in referendums. At the opposite pole are political parties that believe that elected representatives should make the most important political decisions. Where do the parties fall on this dimension?

Experts can respond to this new CHES question using a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 corresponds to “Elected office holders should make the most important decisions” and 10 corresponds to “The people, not politicians, should make the most important decisions”.

In addition to populism, the 2017 CHES questionnaire has items that can be used to estimate the position of the political parties on the following dimensions: i) economic left/right, ii) libertarian vs authoritarian (socio-cultural issues)<sup>5</sup>, iii) attitudes towards immigrants and minorities and iv) attitudes towards the EU<sup>6</sup>. Thus, the 2017 CHES questionnaire seems ideal for scholars who wish to study authoritarian and populist parties.

## Populism items used in voter and elite surveys

This section presents the populist attitudes items that have been used both in candidate and voter surveys. In addition, it is shown how these items have been used to i) discriminate between populist and non-populist actors, ii) to show that voters who have populist attitudes are more inclined to vote for populist parties, and iii) to demonstrate that in some cases (e.g. Greece) populism is a dimension on which voters and candidates are more congruent than other dimensions (e.g. economic left/right, immigration, etc).

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<sup>4</sup> This paper provides evidence that this item does not work very well in estimating populist parties (i.e. there is a low correlation coefficient between this item and other variables known to measure populism).

<sup>5</sup> There is also a new question using the terms GAL/TAN, but it seems that the responses by experts are very similar to their responses on the libertarian vs authoritarian scale and I prefer to keep this item because it was part of older CHES questionnaires too.

<sup>6</sup> Of course, when I test the CHES questionnaire in other regions, the EU related questions are removed

## Voter surveys

The first version of the populist attitudes battery for voter surveys has been developed by Hawkins<sup>7</sup> and Riding (2010). Following their argument that populism is not an ideology, but a worldview that 'identifies Good with a unified will of the people and Evil with a conspiring elite' they have avoided to develop neutral statements of the core ideas of populism. Instead they have tried to develop questions that incorporate both the ideas and the language in which they are expressed. Their first battery of populist attitude items was included in the 2008 AmericasBarometer surveys conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion Project at Vanderbilt University and consisted of nine items. The first three items were developed by other researchers and are based on the conceptualization of populism as a movement involving charismatic leadership and negative attitudes towards the institutions of representative democracy. The next items have been developed by Hawkins and Riding and constitute their attempt to measure populist attitudes as the expression of a struggle between the 'pure' people and the 'corrupt' elite.

- POP101. It is necessary for the progress of this country that our president [prime minister] limits the voice and vote of opposition parties. How much do you agree or disagree with that view?
- POP102. When the Congress hinders the work of our government, our presidents [prime ministers] should govern without the Congress. How much do you agree or disagree with that view?
- POP103. When the Supreme Court [Constitutional Tribunal] hinders the work of our government, it should be ignored by our presidents [prime ministers]. How much do you agree or disagree with that view?
- POP106. Our presidents [prime ministers] must follow the will of the people because what the people want is always right. How much do you agree or disagree with that view?
- POP107. The people should govern directly and not through elected representatives. How much do you agree or disagree?
- POP109. In today's world there is a battle between good and evil, and people must choose between one of the two. How much do you agree or disagree that such a battle between good and evil exists?
- POP110. Once the people decide what is right, we must prevent opposition from a minority. How much do you agree or disagree with that view?
- POP112. The biggest obstacle to progress in our country is the dominant class or oligarchy that takes advantage of the people. How much do you agree or disagree with that view?
- POP113. Those who disagree with the majority represent a threat to the interests of the country. How much do you agree or disagree with that view?

After rescaling the items to a 0-100 scale, Hawkins and Riding find high levels of populist attitudes among the general public: the mean values range between 35 for POP103 (ignore Supreme Court) to 68.2 for POP109 (choose good or evil). Their factor analysis shows that POP106, POP109,

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<sup>7</sup> Kirk Hawkins is the leader of Team Populism, an international network of scholars working on populist attitudes. Almost all attempts to measure populism using survey items are related to his work.

POP110, POP112 and POP113 load on the same factor. Based on this finding they produce an additive populism index as the mean value of these populism questions, i.e.

$[Populism\_index] = (POP106 + POP109 + POP110 + POP112 + POP113) / 5$ .

In the same paper, Hawkins and Riding use a subsample of respondents from the 2008 Cooperative Congressional Elections Studies (CCES), an Internet survey conducted by Yougov/Polimetrix and the 2008 Utah Colleges Exit Poll (UCEP), a sample of 950 respondents that was collected during the November 2008 general elections. The same datasets and a similar analysis were used later in a paper by Hawkins, Riding & Mudde (2012). Both questionnaires included the following populism items:

- POP1 Politics is ultimately a struggle between good and evil.
- POP2 The politicians in Congress need to follow the will of the people.
- POP3 The power of a few special interests prevents our country from making progress.
- POP4 The people, not the politicians, should make the most important policy decisions.

The UCEP questionnaire also included three items on pluralism:

- PLU1 Democracy is about achieving compromise among differing viewpoints.
- PLU2 When our opposition presents new and challenging viewpoints, there is something we can learn by listening.
- PLU3 Freedom depends on diversity.

In addition, the CCES included the following four questions designed to gauge stealth democracy.

- SD1 Elected officials would help the country more if they would stop talking and just take action on important problems.
- SD2 What people call 'compromise' in politics is really just selling out on one's principles.
- SD3 Our government would run better if decisions were left up to successful business people.
- SD4 Our government would run better if decisions were left up to non-elected, independent experts rather than politicians or the people.

Running a factor analysis on the UCEP data they have found that POP1, POP2, POP3 and POP4 load on the same factor and after running a second factor analysis on the CCES data they have found that POP2, POP3, POP4, SD1 and SD2 load on the same factor as well. Using the average values of these variables as populism indices in regression models they have also found that wealth and higher education have a negative impact on populist attitudes. At the same time these attitudes are strongly associated with ideological extremism, and, as far as right-wing populism in USA is concerned, with anti-immigrant policies.

Building on the aforementioned studies, Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove (2014) have tested a battery of items to measure populist attitudes and to investigate whether these attitudes can be linked with party preferences on a representative data set of 586 Dutch respondents. This battery

consists of three types of questions with a target to measure (1) populist attitudes, (2) pluralist attitudes, and (3) elitist attitudes. The questions used are the following:

POP1	The politicians in the Dutch parliament need to follow the will of the people.
POP2	The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.
POP3	The political differences between the elite and the people are larger than the differences among the people.
POP4	I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician.
POP5	Elected officials talk too much and take too little action.
POP6	Politics is ultimately a struggle between good and evil.
POP7	What people call 'compromise' in politics is really just selling out on one's principles.
POP8	Interest groups have too much influence over political decisions.
PLU1	In a democracy it is important to make compromises among differing viewpoints.
PLU2	It is important to listen to the opinion of other groups.
PLU3	Diversity limits my freedom.
ELI1	Politicians should lead rather than follow the people.
ELI2	Our country would be governed better if important decisions were left up to successful business people.
ELI3	Our country would be governed better if important decisions were left up to independent experts.

After performing principal component analysis on these questions, they have found that most of the questions load high on the expected factor. More specifically they have found six populist statements loading high on the populist dimension: POP1 through POP5 and POP7. According to the authors, items POP1 through POP4 reflect the idea that there is a division between the people and the political elite, while the questions POP5 through POP7 capture the so-called Manichean dimension, i.e. the tension between 'good' and 'evil'. Comparing the populist index between voters of different parties they find that voters who score high on the populist scale have a significantly higher preference for the Dutch populist parties: the Party for Freedom and the Socialist Party.

These 6 items were proposed for the CSES Module 5 (2016-2021) by a team of scholars<sup>8</sup> who have collaborated within the Team Populism project led by Kirk Hawkins. I have included the same 6 items in the National Election Study for the Greek Parliamentary Elections of January 2015 (ELNES 2015a). The Greek questionnaire included two additional items developed within the POPULISMUS project. Consequently, **ELNES 2015a** includes the following populist attitudes items:

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<sup>8</sup> These scholars were: Agnes Akkerman (Free University Amsterdam, The Netherlands), Kirk Hawkins (Brigham Young University, USA), Cas Mudde (University of Georgia, USA), Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (Diego Portales University, Chile) and Andrej Zaslove (Radboud University, The Netherlands)

- POP1. The politicians in parliament need to follow the will of the people.
- POP2. The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.
- POP3. The political differences between the elite and the people are larger than the differences among the people.
- POP4. People can be better represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician.
- POP5. Elected officials talk too much and take too little action.
- POP6. What people call 'compromise' in politics is really just selling out on one's principles.
- POP7. Popular demands are today ignored in favour of what benefits the establishment.
- POP8. Political forces representing the people should adopt a more confrontational attitude in order to make their voice heard and influence decision-making.

The first six of these items have been already used in many other countries and it has been shown that voters who agree more with these statements they tend to vote more for populist parties (K. A. Hawkins, Rovira Kaltwasser, Llamazares, Andreadis, & Singer, 2018)

A group of scholars within the Team Populism network (Castanho Silva et al., 2018) has worked on the development of a battery of items by identifying the relevant dimensions of the concept, and developed several items to measure each one of them separately and individually. Next, they performed exploratory analysis to check what dimensions can be found in the data, and which items load onto them. The third step was testing what items, from this second step, are invariant across countries, i.e. whether they measure the same thing, the same way, in the different countries. This effort has resulted in the following items:

*People-centrism:*

- Ppl1. Politicians should always listen closely to the problems of the people.
- Ppl2. Politicians don't have to spend time among ordinary people to do a good job.\*
- PPl3. The will of the people should be the highest principle in this country's politics.

*Anti-elitism:*

- Ant1. The government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves.
- Ant2. Government officials use their power to try to improve people's lives.\*
- Ant3. Quite a few of the people running the government are crooked.

*Manichaeian outlook:*

- Man1. You can tell if a person is good or bad if you know their politics.
- Man2. The people I disagree with politically are not evil.\*
- Man3. The people I disagree with politically are just misinformed.

Finally, at the end of 2015, I was assigned by CSES to conduct one of the pilot studies of the CSES module 5 questionnaire. This study was conducted after the second Parliamentary Elections we had in Greece in the same year, in September 2015 (ELNES 2015b). Although CSES has accepted the

proposal for a battery of populist attitudes items, unfortunately they decided to change a lot of the submitted questions. As a result, ELNES 2015 included the following anti-elite items:

- Q04a. In a democracy it is important to seek compromise among different viewpoints.
- Q04b. Most politicians do not care about the people.
- Q04c. Most politicians are trustworthy.
- Q04d. Politicians are the main problem in Greece.
- Q04e. Having a strong leader in government is good for Greece even if the leader bends the rules to get things done.
- Q04f. The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.
- Q04g. Most politicians care only about the interests of the rich and powerful.
- Q04h. Poor people should have a greater voice in politics.

Three out-group attitudes items (Q05) have also been included in the questionnaire in order to estimate attitudes towards out-groups.

- Q05a. Minorities should adapt to the Greek way of life,
- Q05b. Immigrants are generally good for the Greek economy, and
- Q05c. Greek culture is generally harmed by immigrants.

Finally, there was a battery of seven items (Q06) and the respondents are asked to indicate how important is each of them for someone to be considered as “real” Greek. The exact wording is as follows: “Some people say that the following things are important for being truly Greek. Other says they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is very important, fairly important, not very important, or not important at all?”

- Q06a: to have been born in Greece
- Q06b: to have lived in Greece for most of their life
- Q06c: to be able to speak the Greek language
- Q06d: to be Christian orthodox
- Q06e: to respect the Greek political institutions and laws
- Q06f: to feel Greek
- Q06g: to have Greek ancestry

Although the original statement POP6 in ELNES 2015a can discriminate between populists and non-populists, the new statement Q04a (that was used as a replacement of POP6) cannot be used for the same purpose. As previous studies have shown most populists believe that people who compromise, are selling out their own principles. According to the same studies, the responses to POP6 are highly correlated with the responses to the other populist attitudes items. On the other hand, Q04a was not such a good choice, because almost all respondents agree with this statement. As a result, there is not much variability in responses to Q04a. In fact, the standard deviation of this



variable is only 0.9 and the correlation coefficients with the other seven variables are very close to 0 indicating the Q04a is not highly correlated with any of the other variables<sup>9</sup> As a result, at the 2017 ECPR general conference, when eight populist attitudes scales have been compared on three quality measures: Internal Coherence, Cross-national validity and Conceptual Breadth (Littvay & Castanho Silva, 2017). The worst scale was the new CSES scale which scored “Low” on all tests. The best of them was the scale by Castanho Silva et al. (2018) scoring “High” on all measures, followed by (Akkerman et al., 2014) scoring High, Medium, and Medium respectively.

On the other hand, it is still possible to create good populist indices by selecting only these items from CSES that belong to the same factor/scale. Following this approach, we have created four indices from the aforementioned items and we have found significant relationships between our indices (anti-elite and popular power) and voting behavior during the Greek Parliamentary elections of September 2015. Even after considering various demographic factors in a multinomial logit model we find our indices to function as they were expected: high values of populist indices lead to voting for populist parties and high values of ethnic nationalism and xenophobia indices lead to voting for right-wing, conservative parties (Andreadis, Stavrakakis, & Demertzis, 2018).

## Candidate surveys

The Hellenic (Greek) Candidate Study 2015 included the same battery of eight populist attitudes items which were included in ELNES 2015a. Using these items, it was possible to discriminate between the candidates of populist parties and the candidates of mainstream parties (Stavrakakis, Andreadis, & Katsambekis, 2017). The six first items were also included in elite surveys in many Latin American countries, but the discrimination between populist and non-populist candidates was not so clear as in Greece (Andreadis & Ruth, 2018). Having the same populist attitudes items both in a voter and in a candidate survey enables the comparison between the two groups: For instance, in Greece we have contrasted the low voter-elite congruence marking SYRIZA on a variety of issues such as immigration, law and order and economic policy with the high voter-elite congruence on populist attitudes and attitudes towards the bail-out agreements. We show that a populism/anti-populism cleavage has overdetermined Greek politics much more than a left/right one or particular policy preferences and we conclude that the dominance of the populism/anti-populism cleavage probably explains the rare coalition of a radical left with a radical right party and the resilience of the current Greek government (Andreadis & Stavrakakis, 2017).

In addition, the Comparative Candidates Survey (CCS) Steering Committee has recently opened a call for modules to be included in the CCS round III questionnaire. One of the issues already discussed among the members of the Questionnaire Development Committee (QDC), i.e. the committee that manages the process of developing the new CCS questionnaire was the need for further harmonization between CCS and CSES datasets and it is very possible that some of the items of the Q04 and Q05 of the CSES 5 questionnaire will be included in the final questionnaire of the CCS III. The final decisions on the questionnaire will be taken by the CCS General Assembly that will convene at the 2018 ECPR General Conference in Hamburg. The final round III micro as well as a

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<sup>9</sup> This item has been corrected after the analysis of the datasets collected by the pilot studies (including the Greek ELNES 2015b study and report). There were some additional changes, but as it was shown recently (Littvay & Castanho Silva, 2017) the final CSES battery is still far from perfect.

macro questionnaire will be released shortly after and fieldwork will start in 2019. CCS III is expected to be in the field for 5 years.

## Research Hypotheses and Research Design

### Do we measure the same things?

As mentioned earlier, the CHES questionnaire items can be used to estimate the position of political parties on the following dimensions: i) economic left/right, ii) libertarian vs authoritarian (on socio-cultural issues), iii) attitudes towards immigrants and minorities and iv) populism. CHES has been conducted successfully for many years in European countries and the CHES data have been used by various scholars, many times in comparison with the position of party voters extracted by national post-election surveys that include the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) common core questionnaire or in comparison with the position of party elites extracted by national post-election surveys that include the Comparative Candidates Survey (CCS) common core questionnaire.

However, while CHES and CSES (or CCS) cover similar issues, the wording and format of the questions differs significantly between the surveys. Due to these differences, scholars may be skeptical about the ability of direct comparisons between the CHES data and CSES (or CCS) data. In voter and elite surveys, we are using one-sided questions. A typical example, is the probably most widely used item to measure populist attitudes. Survey participants face the statement: “The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions” and they can indicate the level of their agreement with the statement by choosing one of the following five options: 1. strongly agree, 2. somewhat agree, 3. neither agree nor disagree, 4. somewhat disagree, 5. strongly disagree.

Another important difference between CHES and voter and elite surveys is that they often use different questions to estimate the position of the parties on the same or similar dimensions. For instance, the CHES survey uses the following long question: “Parties can be classified in terms of their stance on economic issues. Parties on the economic left want government to play an active role in the economy. Parties on the economic right emphasize a reduced economic role for government: privatization, lower taxes, less regulation, less government spending, and a leaner welfare state. Please select the number that best describes each party's position on a scale ranging from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right)” On the other hand the other surveys, may measure the same dimension (the economic left/right in this case) with one or more shorter questions (e.g. “Governments should abstain from intervening in the economy” followed by five response options: 1. strongly agree, 2. somewhat agree, 3. neither agree nor disagree, 4. somewhat disagree, 5. strongly disagree).

Considering all the aforementioned concerns, scholars who use CHES data in combination with voter or elite data need to know if they can directly compare the values from CHES with the values from other surveys. It may be a simple transformation from the 0-10 CHES scale to the 1-5 scale (used in voter and elite surveys), but we cannot be sure without testing it. It is very important to know if these differences cause errors in the correlations between CHES and CSES (or other surveys), and if so, in what way, so that we can correct them before applying CHES in other countries. Thus, the first general research question that will be checked in this paper is the following:

**RQ1: Do the (2014 and 2017) CHES items, and the items used in voter and elite surveys measure the same things?**

Before the presentation of the research design for this hypothesis, and before deciding on the instrument to be used for the positioning of political parties on the populism scale we have to clarify the definition of populism. According to many researchers working on the Team Populism project:

“populism is a set of ideas, namely, a discourse that sees politics in Manichaeian terms as a struggle between the people, which is the embodiment of democratic virtue; and a corrupt establishment. Populist ideas may be present to a lesser or greater extent in a policy or organization – it is not a dichotomous phenomenon – but it is the presence of these ideas that allow us to characterize something as (more or less) populist” (K. A. Hawkins, Rovira Kaltwasser, & Andreadis, 2016).

Andreadis, Stavrakakis and Demertzis (2018) are approaching populism as a discursive practice that is:

“first, articulated around the nodal point ‘the people’” instead of “other non-populist nodal points (nation, class, movement, race, etc.)” and, second, “the representation of society it offers is a predominantly antagonistic one, dividing the social field between two antagonistic camps: ‘the people’ (the underdog, the non-privileged, the ‘many’, and so on), on the one side, and the ‘elite’ (the establishment, the power bloc, and so on), on the other”.

Norris and Inglehart (2018) define populism as:

“a rhetorical style of communications claiming that (i) the only legitimate democratic authority flows directly from the people, and (ii) established power-holders are deeply corrupt, and self-interested, betraying the public trust”.

I could go on with other definitions by other authors using slightly different wordings, but the point I would like to raise here is that no matter which of the definitions we prefer, if we want to measure the level of populism of political parties we need to have items on what has been called as “people centrism” (Castanho Silva et al., 2018) or “more power to the people” (Andreadis et al., 2018) or “voice of the people” (Norris & Inglehart, 2018). And this is the main weakness of the 2014 CHES data. As Norris and Inglehart (2018) put it very clearly:

“When it comes to measuring Populism, the crucial element is the importance of appeals calling for power to the people and critiquing the corrupt power of the establishment. In established liberal democracies, the antithesis is pluralism asserting the legitimacy of elected officials and the established institutions of governance. To measure this dimension, two proxy indicators were selected from the CHES dataset: 1) the importance of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric, and 2) the salience of anti-corruption. One important qualification should be noted: these CHES items are help to capture the typical populist critique of corrupt elites, although unfortunately the dataset does not yet gauge populist claims about the moral legitimacy of the voice of the people or the elected representatives.”

As already mentioned, the CHES research team have added a new item in the 2017 questionnaire. On the other hand, as presented in the previous sections, various populist attitudes items have been used in voter and elite surveys and there is evidence that these items work very well in many regions of the world. Thus, these items will be used to check the quality of the CHES (especially the 2014) “populism” items. More specifically we can test if the one or two items that have been included in the 2014 CHES questionnaire (and still used in 2017 CHES) are indeed useful in measuring populism the same way it has been measured in voter and candidate surveys; for

instance, if the “salience of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric” is highly correlated with the items that are used to measure populism in voter and elite surveys, then we will be more confident in using a high score of the CHES salience measurements as an indicator of a populist party (as Norris and Inglehart (2018) do in their book). On the other hand, if the salience measurements are not highly correlated with the items that have been used in other surveys, then we will know that CHES and the other surveys are measuring different things. Thus, we have a more specific version of the general research question.

**RQ2: Do the (2014 and 2017) CHES “populism” items, and the populist attitudes items used in voter and elite surveys measure the same things? If not, which of the CHES items should be used and which should not be used to measure populism?**

In order to answer the research questions RQ1 and RQ2, a questionnaire for an expert survey was designed. The questionnaire consists of two parts: the first part contains the most important questions of the 2017 CHES questionnaire, while the second includes the corresponding questions from CCS, CSES and other voter surveys.

Starting with the populism scale, with the new CHES populism item, experts can position parties using a 0-10 scale, where 0 corresponds to “Elected office holders should make the most important decisions” and 10 corresponds to “The people, not politicians, should make the most important decisions”. Although this new item is a very good addition and it brings CHES closer to other surveys that include populism items, there are still aspects that need to be investigated about the similarity of the values from different surveys on the populism scale. Thus, the second part of the questionnaire includes the following items from the CSES questionnaire:

What people call compromise in politics is really just selling out on one's principles.

Most politicians do not care about the people.

Most politicians care only about the interests of the rich and powerful.

The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions

The last item is asked both as it appears in CHES and as it appears in CSES. This gives us the opportunity to test if the different scale ranges and slightly different question wordings in the two surveys produce the same results. In addition, we include three populist items from other voter and elite surveys. The total list of items included in the questionnaire are presented in the Appendix.

The Authoritarian-Libertarian position of the parties can be estimated by the experts’ assessments on a series of issues: the 2017 CHES has a direct question about the libertarian/postmaterialist vs traditional/authoritarian dimension:

Parties can be classified in terms of their views on democratic freedoms and rights. “Libertarian” or “postmaterialist” parties favour expanded personal freedoms, for example, access to abortion, active euthanasia, same-sex marriage, or greater democratic participation. “Traditional” or “authoritarian” parties often reject these ideas; they value order, tradition, and stability, and believe that the government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues.

In addition, to estimate the position of the parties on attitudes towards immigrants and minorities, we use the following 2017 CHES items:

Position on immigration policy, where 0: Fully opposed to a restrictive policy on immigration and 10: Fully in favour of a restrictive policy on immigration.

Position on integration of immigrants and asylum seekers (multiculturalism vs. assimilation), where 0: Strongly favors multiculturalism and 10: Strongly favors assimilation

Position towards ethnic minorities over the course of 2017, where 0: Strongly supports more rights for ethnic minorities and 10: Strongly opposes more rights for ethnic minorities

For the reasons explained previously (direct comparison between our expert survey and CSES 5/CCS III, the second part of the questionnaire includes five CSES 5 items and experts are asked to choose what each party would answer using the CSES one-sided wording and the five options scale (i.e. from 1. Strongly Agree to 5. Strongly Disagree):

Having a strong leader in government is good for [COUNTRY] even if the leader bends the rules to get things done

Minorities should adapt to the customs and traditions of [COUNTRY].

The will of the majority should always prevail, even over the rights of minorities.

Immigrants are generally good for [COUNTRY]'s economy.

[COUNTRY]'s culture is generally harmed by immigrants.

An additional item that would cover the security dimension could be taken by the core CCS questionnaire (I could not find any relevant items in CSES)

People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences.

Finally, we can collect data on the economic Left-Right dimension which divides left-wing parties favouring statism, and wealth redistribution from right-wing parties supporting free markets and tax cuts. These estimates can be collected by the following the 2017 CHES item:

Parties can be classified in terms of their stance on economic issues. Parties on the economic left want government to play an active role in the economy. Parties on the economic right emphasize a reduced economic role for government: privatization, lower taxes, less regulation, less government spending, and a leaner welfare state, where 0: Extreme left and 10: Extreme right.

We will try to deal with the questions raised in this section with the finding from the first pilot study, an expert survey that was conducted in Greece.

## Extending CHES to other regions

Another significant aspect on the current state of the art of measuring populism using expert surveys that is within the scope of this paper, concerns the geographical coverage of the expert surveys. The main research questions here are the following: Are we able to go far beyond the limited scope of CHES (Europe) and a number of countries in Latin America (covered by the current efforts in the Team Populism network)? Can we use the CHES question wording in other regions, i.e. are political parties experts familiar with the terms used in the CHES questionnaire? Is it possible to design a questionnaire similar to the CHES questionnaire that could be applied in every region of the world? Probably, all these questions are related to a more general question which will be our third research question.

**RQ3: Are the three (excluding EU attitudes) main CHES dimensions (economic left/right, libertarian/authoritarian and populism) relevant in other party systems outside Europe?**

Another question is related to the new book on authoritarian populism by Norris and Inglehart (2018), where they use CHES data to generate a two-axes political map with all European parties positioned on it. The Authoritarian-Libertarian axis divides parties over social and cultural issues like abortion, immigration, Europe, and gay rights. The Populist-Pluralist axis divides parties over the location of legitimate authority in governance. With their map, they can compare European party competition and they can classify political parties, located at the extreme poles of the continuum. Then they use selected case studies to illustrate some of the main contrasts. With this map, Norris and Inglehart (2018) provide a significant improvement over their previous map of European Political parties (Inglehart & Norris, 2016) where they combined the populism axis with the authoritarian axis resulting in the classification of the most typical examples of libertarian populist parties in Europe (e.g. Podemos in Spain and Syriza in Greece) as non-populist. But as Norris and Inglehart (2018) argue in their new book: “Not all populists endorse authoritarianism, and authoritarian rulers do not necessarily adopt populist appeals”.

Thus, according to the most recent research on European political parties, the two most important dimensions in Europe are the dimension on populism vs pluralism and the libertarian vs authoritarian dimension. Populism can be considered as a political ideology of governance which is about legitimate authority and not a substantive policy program (Norris & Inglehart, 2018) or a “thin ideology (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013; Stanley, 2008). As put by Hawkins, Rovira Kaltwasser and Andreadis (2016) “... the populist set of ideas should not be seen as a consistent ideology or a coherent programmatic position. ... political discourses such as populism are not consciously articulated and consequently have limited programmatic scope”. As a result, populism can co-exist with other “thick” ideologies and it is usually orthogonal to them. Thus, it makes perfect sense to use a second axis that will be orthogonal to the populism axis. Following Norris and Inglehart (2018) this second axis can be the Libertarian/Authoritarian dimension. On the one pole of this dimension we have libertarianism: support for policies that emphasize on multicultural diversity, the importance of personal choices and freedoms (of speech, religion, association etc) and the protection of women and minority rights. On the other pole of this dimension we have authoritarianism which emphasizes on the importance of order, tradition, security and stability.

Thus, the final research question of this paper is the following: If we estimate the positions of the political parties using expert assessments and a method similar to the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) and choose the two most important dimensions to create a political map similar to the one created by Norris and Inglehart (2018) for the European parties, what this map would look like? Would it be like the map used for the European Political parties, or other dimensions would be more important?


**RQ4: From the three CHES dimensions, which two are the most important and they should be used in a political map in other, non-European countries?**

In order to deal with the questions raised in this section, we use the second pilot study, an expert survey conducted in Australia.

## Findings

Do we measure the same things?

### Populism




*Figure 1 People should make the most important decisions (CHES vs CSES)*

In this case we have two items which are very similar to each other. The straight line represents the values we would observe if the two items were linked by a simple linear transformation from the CHES scale (0, 10) to the CSES scale (1, 5). The curved line is a smooth representation of the observed points. In general, there is a strong correlation ( $r=0.63$ ) between the two items. Observing the gap on the lower left part of the diagram, it seems that many of the experts who code a party near the lower extreme of the two - sided CHES scale, they give the same party a higher score on the CSES one-sided scale. This means that when they must use a scale where there are two very clear alternatives (“elected office holders” vs “people”), they may choose the lowest value of the scale (indicating that the specific party is with the elected office holders). On the other hand, when they must code the same party on the CSES item, the alternative to the people is not very clear because: i) it is not mentioned on the scale, but only on the text of the question and ii) the alternative refers generally to the politicians (not elected officers). As a result, when experts answer to this question they give the same party a higher score.

Another possible explanation, of the observed differences may be that in the CHES question wording when it is described that people should have the final say on the most important issues, it mentions referendums: “...for example, by voting directly in referendums”. By giving this example, it is possible that the CHES question makes experts position parties on a different dimension (direct vs representative democracy, which is not the same as the dimension on populism: especially right wing populism is usually associated with a preference for a strong leader and in this case there is no

need for the active participation of voters in the decision process through referendums, because the strong leader is taking the decision on behalf of the people and for the people.



*Figure 2 People should make the most important decisions per party (CHES vs CSES)*

The analysis by party, provides more evidence that supports the hypothesis of the impact of the lack of a clear alternative in the CSES item. The largest difference between the expect values (straight line) and the observed values (curved line) is observed at the left part of the diagram for the Greek communist party (KKE). The Greek communist party is one of the oldest established parties in Greece and it actively participates in the procedures of the national parliament and of the regional and local assemblies. As a result, KKE gets a low value on the CHES scale by many experts. On the other hand, KKE scores higher on the CSES scale because the lack of a clear alternative to the people, could mean that if the decisions were not made by the people, they could be against the working class (e.g. by politicians serving the interest of the rich and the powerful).


Another example that support the hypothesis of the “lack of clear alternative” is the River. This party supports a more technocratic model of government where the decisions are based on scientific evidence. As a result, there are many experts who position the party on the middle of the CHES scale (keeping almost equal distance by the elected officials and the people) and they give a low score on the CSES scale (indicating that the lack of a clear alternative to the people, leaves space to experts to indicate that someone else - in the case of the RIVER the scientists and knowledgeable - should make the most important decisions).

Mokken Scale Analysis (MSA) on the responses to the CHES items shows that corrupt is only weakly associated with people, while antielite and people form together a stronger scale. Thus, it seems wrong to use corrupt to create a populism index from CHES items. Thus, we create the index CHESpop using the variables people and antielite only. On the other hand, the MSA on the CSES and related survey items shows that the variables Q04a, Q04b, pop1, pop3, pop4, Q04f and Q04g belong



on the same strong scale and we create a CSESpop index by calculating their mean. It should be noted here that the CSES item Q04e, although CSES has included it in the anti-elite battery, does not belong in this scale. In fact, MSA shows that it is (weakly) associated with the authoritarian items.

The two new indices have a stronger correlation ( $r=0.70$ ), but there is still a gap between the two lines near the extremes. If the CHES Populism index included corrupt, this would lead to a lower correlation coefficient ( $r=0.68$ ). Since CHES 2014 included only corrupt and anti-elite, here is some useful info for scholars working with these data. A CHES Populism index created by corruption and antielite has a lower correlation coefficient with CSESpop ( $r=0.61$ ) than antielite alone ( $r=0.64$ ). As a clear answer to the second research question and a convincing evidence towards avoiding the use of corruption salience to measure populism see the following diagram:



*Figure 3 Salience of corruption vs populism index*

*Table 1 Comparison of populism indexes*

Party	CSES	CHES2017 2 items	CHES2017 3 items	CHES14
ANEL	6,58	6,65	6,58	7,05
DS	3,93	3,27	3,90	4,15
EK	6,34	6,22	6,66	7,35
GD	7,72	7,76	7,59	8,29
KKE	7,74	7,36	7,34	7,96
ND	3,12	1,99	3,11	3,65
RIVER	3,66	3,59	4,59	5,08
SYRIZA	6,60	7,58	7,33	7,82

As Table 1 indicates, the new CHES party positions on populism work very well. The addition of the new item in CHES 2017 has greatly reduced the distance between CSES and CHES.

## Immigrants, minorities and libertarian vs authoritarian

### Single item

The CHES items on multiculturalism vs assimilation is closely related to the CSES Q05a item. Their correlation coefficient is one of the highest in this study ( $r=0.77$ ), but still there is a gap between the expected (straight line) and the observed (curved line) values near the extremes of the CHES scale. It seems that the experts select the extreme value on the 11-point scale much easier than the extreme of the 5-point scale. This seems to happen more frequently on the lower extreme, rather than the higher extreme.





Figure 4 Multiculturalism (CHES vs CSES)

### Immigrant and minorities indices


There are three items in the CHES questionnaire related to immigrants and minorities (immigrate, multiculturalism and ethnic) and they are closely related to each other. Their correlation coefficients are: (0.82, 0.80 and 0.88) and MSA indicates that they belong to the same scale. Their Cronbach's alpha is 0.94. In addition, the five items in CSES Q05 on minorities and immigrants are also very closely related. Their polychoric alpha is 0.96 and MSA indicates that they belong to the same scale. Thus, we can create one index related to immigrants and minorities both for CHES (averaging the 3 items) and for CSES (averaging 5 items). The two new indexes have a high correlation coefficient ( $r=0.89$ ), but using the CSES we will get slightly lower scores in most of the cases (with the exception of the lower extreme of the CHES scale).



*Figure 5 Immigrants and minorities index (CHES vs CSES)*


### **Libertarian/Authoritarian**

There are three items in the core CCS questionnaire C2d, C2f, C2j that are related with attitudes on the socio-cultural (libertarian vs authoritarian) dimension. Their polychoric alpha is rather high ( $\alpha=0.9$ ) and MSA indicates that the three items belong on the same scale. Thus, we can create a Libertarian/Authoritarian (or GAL/TAN) index by averaging these items and compare this index with the CHES Libertarian/Authoritarian measure. The two variables have a high correlation coefficient ( $r=0.85$ ), but using the CCS index we get slightly lower scores in most of the cases (with the exception of the lower extreme of the CHES scale).



*Figure 6 Libertarian vs Authoritarian index (CHES vs CSES)*

If we observe the relationship between the two variables per party, there is a large difference between the two lines for SYRIZA. Some experts give low scores to SYRIZA on the CCS items (reflecting the fact that SYRIZA is a socially libertarian party), but when they use the CHES scale, they assign higher values to SYRIZA. This difference can be justified, because when the experts use the CHES scale they probably do not take into account the preferences of the SYRIZA on socio-cultural issues only, but they may also take into account the authoritarian stances in the way that SYRIZA has dealt with some cases (e.g. TV licenses, independent authorities, etc) while in government.



*Figure 7 Libertarian vs Authoritarian index per party (CHES vs CSES)*

#### **Libertarian/Pro-immigrant vs Authoritarian/Anti-immigrant**

Finally, MSA shows that in both groups (the group of CHES items and the group of items by CSES and CCS) the libertarian/authoritarian items are closely associated and belong to the same scale with the items about immigrants and minorities. The Cronbach's alpha for the 4 CHES items (immigrate, multiculturalism, ethnic, galton) is 0.95. In addition, the five items in CSES Q05 on minorities and immigrants and the three items on socio-cultural issues C2d, C2f, C2j are also very closely related. Their polychoric alpha is 0.97. Thus, we can create new indices for both groups and compare them. According to MSA, Q04e could belong to this scale, but it would make it weaker. The same conclusion comes from the item analysis of the polychoric alpha. As a result, it is better to create the scale without Q04e.

The new indices that combine the GAL/TAN items with the items related to attitudes towards immigrants and minorities seem to work better for all Greek parties.




Figure 8 Libertarian/Pro-immigrant vs Authoritarian/Anti-immigrant index per party (CHES vs CSES)


Table 2 Comparison of Libertarian/Authoritarian (GAL/TAN) and immigration indexes

party	CSES imm	CHES imm	CCS galtan	CHES galtan	CCS-CSES Galtanimm	CHES galtanimm
ANEL	7,92	8,42	7,69	8,79	7,83	8,52
DS	3,80	4,95	3,55	3,90	3,72	4,70
EK	6,86	7,43	7,12	7,56	6,89	7,48
GD	9,90	9,75	9,46	9,95	9,77	9,81
KKE	3,18	3,23	4,29	5,43	3,57	3,94
ND	6,42	7,61	6,54	7,21	6,44	7,53
RIVER	2,69	3,60	2,17	2,50	2,51	3,32
SYRIZA	1,49	2,07	1,06	2,00	1,33	2,06

As Table 2 shows, all pairs work well. Libertarian vs authoritarian (GAL/TAN) and immigration can be compared separately or in a combined scale with equally good results. However, in the case of Greece, the average absolute difference of these scales are larger than the corresponding difference on the populism scales.

## Economic Left/Right


For the economic left/right the CCS item C2b is used along with the CHES Irecon item. Their correlation coefficient is not very high ( $r=0.54$ ) and the diagram show a significant gap near higher extreme of the CHES scale.



*Figure 9 Economic Left/Right (CHES vs CSES)*

As it is shown on Figure 10, the party with the largest differences is Golden Dawn (GD), a party that uses an anti-immigrant rhetoric and focuses mainly on socio-cultural issues. It seems that when some of the experts face the CHES economic left/right question and they have to code a party that does not have a clear position on this issue because the issue is not salient for the party (like GD), they may use the general left/right position of the party as a proxy. This could explain why some experts have positioned GD on the economic right, but when they are asked to code the party on a more specific issue of the economic policy (e.g. if the governments should intervene in the economy) they assigned lower scores to GD.

A similar explanation can justify the large gap on the diagram for SYRIZA. When experts are asked to score SYRIZA on the specific question, they clearly and correctly classify SYRIZA on the economic left. But, when they face the more general CHES wording, they may take into account the fact that SYRIZA as government was forced to continue the austerity policies. From this point of view, some experts have positioned SYRIZA more to the right on the CHES economic left/right scale.



*Figure 10 Economic Left/Right per party (CHES vs CCS)*

As Table 3 indicates, this is the worst pair he have compared so far. The average absolute difference is circa 1.5. We probably need more items on the economic left/right dimension.

*Table 3 Comparison of the Economic Left/Right indexes*


Party	CCS econ	CHES econ
ANEL	3,82	5,93
DS	4,70	5,74
EK	4,87	6,14
GD	1,86	6,37
KKE	0,67	0,72
ND	7,13	7,91
RIVER	7,13	7,05
SYRIZA	1,44	3,36

As a general conclusion from this section, and a general answer to the first research question of this paper, it seems that the CHES questionnaire works well as CHES and CSSES/CCS items give in most of the cases very similar results. The most significant differences appear on the economic Left/Right dimension which is not important for the main focus of the current project, i.e. to measure populism and authoritarianism. However, due to this finding, the next pilot study (see next section) includes two more items, related to the economic left/right dimension, from voter surveys. In addition, it should be noted that the main answer to the second research question, is the clear evidence towards the great improvement on measuring populism by the addition of the new “people” item in the CHES 2017 questionnaire.



## Extending CHES to other regions<sup>10</sup>

When we apply a questionnaire like the CHES questionnaire to new country, we have to check if the items reflect the major dimensions of electoral competition in the country. We need to keep only the questions that are relevant to the system of the political parties in the country and the main dimensions of their debate. In order to decide which of the items in the questionnaire are relevant to Australian politics, we invited Australian politics experts to position the Australian political parties (currently represented in the lower and/or upper house)<sup>11</sup> on them. After collecting the answers given by the experts, I analyzed the variance of the positions of each party on each issue, because large variance means that the experts do not share a common opinion about the position of the party on the specific issue. Of course, as it was noted by one of the survey participants “many of the smaller parties have only a handful of core positions and none on all the other (they will often vote with their allied bigger party on these other issues and use this as bargaining potential for the few policies they care about)”. Thus, I expect that some of the smaller parties will have a large variance on some issues. On the other hand, if there are issues for which we observe a large variance for most of the parties, these issues are probably not relevant to the Australian politics and should not be used for further analysis.




*Figure 11 Economic Left/Right (Australian Political Parties Boxplots)*

<sup>10</sup> The Australian survey includes two additional items: “The trade unions in this country have too much power”, and “Income and wealth should be redistributed towards ordinary working people”. These items have been taken from the 2016 Australian Election Study, The Social Research Centre, Australian National University.

<sup>11</sup> The list of the Australian political parties is available in the Appendix

As Figure 11 displays the boxplots of the Australian political parties on the economic left/right dimension as asked by CHES. I am using the interquartile range (IQR)<sup>12</sup> as a measure of the variance of the position of each party. In this figure, we can see that most experts are in strong agreement on the position of the parties. For instance, at least half of the experts agree that on this dimension (where 0 corresponds to Economic Left and 10 to Economic Right), the position of the Green party should be somewhere between 2 and 3. On the other hand, there is larger uncertainty about the position of One Nation (which could be an indicator that this party does not have a very clear position on this axis. In general, this is an item that can be used in Australia because most of the experts had no problems to code the Australian political parties on it.



*Figure 12 Salience of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric (Australian Political Parties Boxplots)*

On the other hand, as Figure 12 shows, the CHES item “Salience of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric” has caused a lot of disagreements between the experts for almost all Australian political parties. Even for large parties (e.g. the Liberal/National coalition) and even when we exclude the 25% most extremes scores from both sides of the scale, the remaining 50% of (less extreme) experts do not even agree on the side of the scale (i.e. if the score should be lower or higher than the middle position).

In order to identify the questions with large uncertainty, first, the IQR for each party / item combination is calculated (i.e. I get the range of values given by the “middle” 50% of the experts). Then, to get a quick summary of these values I calculate the average IQR over all parties and then I divide by the total range of the scale to get an estimate of what part of the total scale is represented


<sup>12</sup> On the boxplot this is depicted by the height of each box

by the IQR. The following table displays the questions with the larger uncertainty for all Australian political parties:

*Table 4 Questions with large uncertainty*

question	mean(IQR)	scale	IQR/scale
antielite	4.95	10	0.495
Q04g	1.98	4	0.494
Q04a	1.95	4	0.488
Q04e	1.70	4	0.425
Q04b	1.63	4	0.406
Q07	1.20	3	0.400

Table 4 indicates that most of the items related to the populist dimension (both from the CHES and CSES survey) are not relevant to the Australian politics. As a result, the populist dimension is not important for the Australian political parties. This means, that at least on the supply side of politics, populism (as we know it and as we measure it in Europe) has not travelled to Australia. Since the Q04 items on the table have been taken by the CSES questionnaire that will be applied to the next cycle of the Australian Election Voter Study, it will be very interesting to compare with the findings of the demand side (voters) of the Australian politics.



*Figure 13 Populism index (Australian Political Parties Boxplots)*

On the other hand, there are four vote survey populist items with lower IQRs: pop1, pop3, pop4, and Q04f. According to MSA, they belong to a single scale and we can create a populist index by them. Figure 13 indicates that if there is any supply of some kind of populism in Australia, this probably comes from three small parties: Justice, KAP and One Nation. On the anti-populism side,

we can find Labor, Liberal and National parties. The rest of the parties are positioned in the middle of the scale.

Thus, the answer to the third research question of this paper, is that only two of the three CHES dimensions (economic left/right and libertarian/authoritarian)<sup>13</sup> can travel to Australian politics without problems, while the third dimension (populism) has many problems.

Even if we accept populism as a third dimension in Australian politics, the other two are more important because the Australian political parties are more polarized on them. Party polarization is an important factor when we want to decide on which dimensions should be used on a two-dimensional political map. The items of the questionnaire used in the two dimensions of the map should have adequate discriminating power to facilitate the discrimination between the political parties. Thus, we need to check whether the political parties have significantly different positions on each issue and we need to choose the dimensions that include the items which pass this test.

*Table 5 The items on which the parties are less polarized*

question	min	max	range	scale	rtos
<b>people</b>	3.5	6	2.5	10	0.25
<b>Q04b</b>	4	5	1	4	0.25
<b>pop1</b>	2	3	1	4	0.25
<b>corrupt</b>	4	7.5	3.5	10	0.35
<b>antielite</b>	4	8	4	10	0.4
<b>pop3</b>	2	4	2	4	0.5
<b>Q04g</b>	2	4	2	4	0.5
<b>Q04e</b>	2	4	2	4	0.5

As we can see in Table 5, two of the items that have been used for the populism scale, appear at the top of the table of the less polarized items. This is clear indicator, that the political map of the Australian political parties should use the other two CHES dimensions. This answers our last research question.

As a result, the map of the Australian political parties is different from the map of the European parties because in Australia the most important dimensions of political competition is the economic left/right and a socio-cultural dimensions of libertarians (on social issues) vs authoritarians or more traditionalists (on socio-cultural issues). Figure 14 displays the corresponding two-dimensional Australian political map and depicts the position of the Australian political parties on it.

<sup>13</sup> After conducting tests similar to those conducted on the Greek data, we have found that the Lib\Auth dimension is closely associated with the attitudes towards immigrants and minorities and as we did in Greece, we use a scale that combines these items for Australia too.




Figure 14 Australian Political Map

## Conclusions

This paper presents the findings of two pilot studies related to the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES). The main questions of the 2017 CHES questionnaire were included on a new questionnaire along with items that have been used in voter and elite surveys. The main object of these pilot studies was to seek answers to the following research questions: Do the CHES items, and the items used in voter and elite surveys measure the same things? And more specifically can we use the 2014 “salience” items to measure the populism levels of political parties? Do the main CHES dimensions (excluding attitudes towards EU) travel well in other regions of the world? Is the populism dimension relevant in other countries (e.g. Australia)?

As a general conclusion from this paper, I argue that if the specific dimension is relevant for the politics of the country, then the CHES items work very well and CHES and CSES/CCS items give very similar results. This is an important finding, because it enables scholars to link different studies and use data from different sources to study party/elite/voter congruence while feeling rather safe that the different studies measure roughly the same things. At the same time, the findings presented in this paper enables us to be rather flexible when we want to apply CHES in another region. For instance, if the CHES terminology (e.g. GAL/TAN, Libertarian/Authoritarian) is not familiar to the experts of a country (or they are considered too complicated), we can use the simpler questions which correspond to the specific dimension (e.g. Same-sex marriages should be prohibited by law, etc).

Having said that CHES and other surveys measure (at least roughly) the same things, I should also point out that some of the differences in the question wording may lead to important

differences, especially for some parties (e.g. the large gap on populism for the Greek Communist Party, or the large gap for Golden Dawn on the economic left/right).

Another significant finding concerns the use of CHES “salience” items (corruption and anti-elite) to measure populism. I have demonstrated that the new 2017 CHES Populism index is much better than the 2014 CHES Populism index. There is a great improvement on measuring populism by the addition of the new “people” item in the 2017 CHES questionnaire.

This paper also shows that if there is any supply of some kind of populism in Australia, this probably comes from three small parties: Justice, KAP and One Nation, but their “populism” position is very unclear. Most of the items related to the populist dimension (both from the CHES and the other surveys) are not relevant to the Australian politics. This means, that at least on the supply side of politics, populism (as we know it and as we measure it in Europe) has not travelled to Australia. Since some of the tested items have been taken by the CSES questionnaire that will be applied to the next cycle of the Australian Election Voter Study, it will be very interesting to compare with the findings of the demand side (Australian voters).

As a final note, I would like to point out the benefits of having similar (or even better, exactly the same) items in the questionnaires of CHES, CSES and CCS. By doing that, we will be able to compare the position of the voters of a party (extracted by voter surveys), with the position of the elites of the same party (extracted by candidate surveys) and the position of the party extracted by our expert survey using exactly the same items in all three groups.

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## Appendix

### Questionnaire

(Irgen)

We start with a few questions on the ideological positions of political parties in Greece in 2018.

Please select the number that best describes for each party, the overall ideology of its leadership on a scale ranging from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right).

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

0: Extreme left    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10:  
Extreme right

(Irecon)

Parties can be classified in terms of their stance on economic issues. Parties on the economic left want government to play an active role in the economy. Parties on the economic right emphasize a reduced economic role for government: privatization, lower taxes, less regulation, less government spending, and a leaner welfare state. Please select the number that best describes each party's position on a scale ranging from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right).

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

0: Extreme left    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10:  
Extreme right

(galtan)

Parties can be classified in terms of their views on democratic freedoms and rights. "Libertarian" or "postmaterialist" parties favor expanded personal freedoms, for example, access to abortion, active euthanasia, same-sex marriage, or greater democratic participation. "Traditional" or "authoritarian" parties often reject these ideas; they value order, tradition, and stability, and believe that the government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues. Please select the number that best describes each party's position..

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

0:Libertarian/ Postmaterialist    1    2    3    4    5:Center    6    7  
8    9    10:Traditional/ Authoritarian

(immigrate)

Next, we would like you to consider where political parties stood on the following policy dimensions in Greece in 2018. Position on immigration policy.

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

0: Fully opposed to a restrictive policy on immigration      1      2      3      4      5  
 6      7      8      9      10: Fully in favour of a restrictive policy on immigration

(multiculturalism)

Position on integration of immigrants and asylum seekers (multiculturalism vs. assimilation).

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

0: Strongly favors multiculturalism      1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8  
 9      10: Strongly favors assimilation

(ethnic) Position towards ethnic minorities over the course of 2018.

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

0: Strongly supports more rights for ethnic minorities      1      2      3      4      5  
 6      7      8      9      10: Strongly opposes more rights for ethnic minorities

(people) We'd like your opinion on where political parties stand on populism and corruption. Some political parties take the position that 'the people' should have the final say on the most important issues, for example, by voting directly in referendums. At the opposite pole are political parties that believe that elected representatives should make the most important political decisions. Where do the parties fall on this dimension?

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

0: Elected office holders should make the most important decisions      1      2      3  
 4      5      6      7      8      9      10: The people, not politicians, should make the most important decisions

(antielite)

Salience of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric.

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

0: Not important at all      1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9  
 10: Extremely important

(corrupt) Salience of reducing political corruption.

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

0: Not important at all      1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9  
 10: Extremely important

(eu)

How would you describe the general position on European integration that the party leadership took over the course of 2018?

(applied only in European countries)

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

1: Strongly opposed in favour	Opposed In favour	Somewhat opposed 7: Strongly in favour	Neutral	Somewhat
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CSES and CCS surveys

(Q04a) Thank you for completing the CHES part of the questionnaire. Now, we would like you to position the same parties on similar issues, using items that are used in voter and candidates surveys. To begin this second section, we would like you to indicate the position of the leadership of each party on the following statement: What people call compromise in politics is really just selling out on one's principles.

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree			

(Q04b) Most politicians do not care about the people.

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree			

(pop1) The politicians in [Congress/parliament] need to follow the will of the people.

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree			

(pop3) The political differences between the people and the elite are larger than the differences among the people.

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree			

(pop4) People can be better represented by an ordinary citizen than an experienced politician.

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree			

(Q04e)

Having a strong leader in government is good for [COUNTRY] even if the leader bends the rules to get things done.

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree			

(Q04f)

The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree			

(Q04g)

Most politicians care only about the interests of the rich and powerful.

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree			

(Q05a)

Minorities should adapt to the customs and traditions of [COUNTRY].

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree			

(Q05b)

The will of the majority should always prevail, even over the rights of minorities.

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree			

(Q05c) Immigrants are generally good for [COUNTRY]'s economy.

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree			

(Q05d)

[COUNTRY]'s culture is generally harmed by immigrants.

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree			

(Q05e)

Immigrants increase crime rates in [COUNTRY].

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree			

(C2d) Same-sex marriages should be prohibited by law.

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree			

(C2f) People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences.

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree			

(C2j) Women should be free to decide on matters of abortion.

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree			

(C2b) Governments should abstain from intervening in the economy.

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree			

(Q07) According to the leadership of each political party, how widespread is corruption such as bribe taking among politicians in [COUNTRY]:

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

VERY WIDESPREAD	QUITE WIDESPREAD	NOT VERY WIDESPREAD	IT HARDLY HAPPENS AT ALL
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(C4) According to the leadership of each political party, is [country's] membership of the European Union a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?

(applied only in European countries)

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

a good thing	a bad thing	neither
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(C5) Some say European unification should be pushed further. Others say it already has gone too far. What is the opinion of the leadership of each political party?

(applied only in European countries)

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

0: has already gone too far	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10: should be pushed further							

Items from the 2016 Australian Election Study (applied only on the Australian expert survey)

D13b: The trade unions in this country have too much power

D13d: Income and wealth should be redistributed towards ordinary working people

## List of the Australian Political Parties

Liberal Party of Australia

National Party of Australia

Australian Labor Party

Australian Greens

Centre Alliance

Pauline Hanson's One Nation

Katter's Australian Party

Derryn Hinch's Justice Party

Liberal Democratic Party

Australian Conservatives